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This paper analyzes the demand for homeowners insurance in markets subject to 
catastrophe losses and where consumers have choices in configuring their 
coverage for catastrophe and non-catastrophe perils. We estimate the demand for 
homeowner insurance in Florida and New York using two-stage least squares 
regression with advisory indicated loss costs as our proxy for the quantity of real 
insurance services demanded. We decompose the demand for insurance into the 
demand for coverage of catastrophe perils (i.e., hurricanes or windstorms) and 
the demand for non-catastrophe coverage and estimate these demand functions 
separately. Our results are relatively consistent in New York and Florida, 
including evidence that catastrophe demand is more price elastic than non-
catastrophe demand. We also find evidence that consumers value options that 
expand coverage, buy more insurance when it is subsidized through regulatory 








A. The Problem of Catastrophe Risk 
The risk of natural disasters in the U.S. has significantly increased in recent years, straining 
private insurance markets and creating troublesome problems for disaster-prone areas. The threat 
of mega-catastrophes resulting from intense hurricanes or earthquakes striking major population 
centers has dramatically altered the insurance environment. Estimates of probable maximum 
losses (PMLs) to insurers from a mega-catastrophe striking the U.S. range up to $100 billion 
depending on the location and intensity of the event (Grace, et. al., 2001).
1 While insurers’ 
capital has increased and they have employed other measures to increase their security against 
catastrophe losses, a severe disaster could still have a significant financial impact on the industry 
(Cummins, Doherty, and Lo, 1999; ISO, 1996a). 
                                                 
1 These probable maximum loss (PML) estimates are based on a 500-year “return” period. In other words, the 




Increased catastrophe risk poses difficult challenges for insurers, reinsurers, property 
owners and public officials (Kleindorfer and Kunreuther, 1999). The fundamental dilemma 
concerns insurers’ ability to finance low-probability, high-consequence (LPHC) events, which 
generates a host of interrelated issues with respect to how the risk of such events are managed, 
financed and priced at various levels (Russell and Jaffe, 1997). Insurers have sought to raise their 
prices and decrease their exposure to catastrophe losses, while looking for efficient ways to 
diversify their exposure through reinsurance and securitization. 
However, state legislators and insurance regulators have resisted insurers’ efforts to raise 
prices and manage their exposures in an attempt to preserve the availability and affordability of 
insurance coverage (Klein, 1998). Regulatory restrictions have been complemented by state 
government insurance mechanisms with significant flaws (Marlett and Eastman, 1998). 
Government policies have imposed substantial cross-subsides from low-risk to high-risk areas as 
well as cross subsidies from non-catastrophe lines of insurance to the catastrophe lines. These 
policies distort incentives and undermine the ability of market forces to make necessary 
adjustments and operate effectively in managing catastrophe risk (Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer, 
1999). 
 
B. Overview of Study 
As concerns about natural disasters have assumed center stage, researchers have begun to 
explore the special problems disasters pose as well as their implications for insurance markets. 
Understandably, recent research on catastrophe risk has focused on the topics of industry 
capacity, reinsurance, securitization, and mitigation. Yet, much less is known about the 




primary insurers and individual consumers). Analyzing the supply of and demand for catastrophe 
insurance and integrating this analysis with research on risk diversification and mitigation is 
essential to formulating a more complete picture of the catastrophe risk problem and evaluating 
viable solutions. 
This paper constitutes the first significant attempt to examine the nature of the demand 
for insurance against natural disasters at a detailed, microeconomic level. Our examination has 
been made possible with the unprecedented assembly of an extensive, detailed database on 
residential insurance transactions affected by catastrophe risk. These data are supplemented by 
information on insurer financial and organizational characteristics and the demographics of 
residential households at a Zip code level. 
We explore several significant aspects of residential insurance markets threatened by 
natural disasters. Our initial work has concentrated on the key determinants of the demand for 
residential/catastrophe insurance and their effects on the quantity, quality and price of insurance 
purchased. Among the phenomena we seek to illuminate are the sensitivity of demand to prices, 
income, policy features, and the bundling/unbundling of perils and coverages. Further, we 
examine insurer and consumer decisions in different market and regulatory environments – 
Florida and New York – over a four-year period 1995-1998. 
 
C. Summary of Findings 
Our analysis of the demand for home insurance under catastrophe risk yields a number of 
interesting results. First, for both New York and Florida, the demand for catastrophe coverage is 
more price elastic than for non-catastrophe coverage. Secondly, we find that the income 




inferior good. We also find that rate compression by regulators increases the demand for 
insurance in both the New York and Florida markets. Regulation has had a bigger impact in the 
Florida market where rate compression has been more severe. We also find that consumers tend 
to value some coverage additions more than others. Interestingly, it appears that consumers 
tradeoff higher wind deductibles for additional coverage in other policy provisions. We also find 
evidence consumers consider guaranty fund provisions when purchasing insurance. For Florida, 
we find that high quality solvency prospects (as measured by A.M. Best ratings) is more 
important for consumers who may have claims above Florida guaranty fund coverage limits than 
for those consumers who would not have claims above the coverage limit. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides background on the demand for insurance 
that we will use in our methodology; Section III contains a description of the methodology and 
the results; Section IV summarizes the results of our analysis. 
 
 
II. The Demand for Homeowners Insurance 
A. Introduction to the Demand Analysis 
To obtain estimates of the demand for homeowners insurance products, significant amounts 
of micro-level data are required. With the assistance of the Insurance Services Office (ISO), we 
obtained essentially transaction-level information from a group of primary insurers writing 
business in Florida and New York that report detailed premium and exposure data to ISO. We 
use the data for the four-year period 1995-1998 for the analyses that are reported here.
2 
                                                 
2 The sample of insurers was drawn from the top 50 insurer groups in New York and Florida in terms of market 
share. It should be noted that our database contains only a subset of insurers that report statistical data to ISO. A 
cross-section of companies is represented in terms of size, organizational forms, and distribution systems. We 




The database contains full homeowners premium and exposure data for 60 companies, 
comprising some 20 groups, taken as a snapshot in the first quarter of each of the four years, 
1995-1998. Each exposure record contains slightly aggregated information on similar groups of 
policies in every Zip code in which reporting companies did business. The information contains 
relevant data regarding the characteristics of the policies actually purchased by homeowners for 
each such company, including premiums, structural information on the nature of the insured 
property, and coverages purchased. Additionally, we have compiled financial and organizational 
data on the insurers in our sample, as well as household economic and demographic data (from 
the 1990 Census) by Zip code. 
By analyzing locational information (Zip code, standard ISO reporting territory and 
community characteristics), information on the company selling the policy, and Census 
information on the socio-demographic characteristics of each Zip code, a very rich picture of the 
nature of demand for homeowners insurance coverage can be deduced using standard 
econometric techniques. It should be noted that the database constructed has exposure records for 
homeowners multiperil insurance. The peril of interest in this research is windstorm, particularly 
hurricanes. We first provide a brief introduction to the foundations of the modeling used in this 
process. 
 
B. Modeling the Demand for Insurance Products 
Introduction to the Structure of Demand for Homeowners Insurance 
There are several features of this market that serve to constrain and structure the analysis of 
demand. First, we assume that homeowners insurance, including coverage against windstorm 




policy, i.e., they have no property insurance, if not subject to lenders’ requirements.
3 Consider 
this "no coverage" option as purchasing an insurance product with "infinite deductibles" at a 
price of zero. Also, insureds may elect to exclude wind coverage from their policy or select a 
higher deductible for losses caused by wind or hurricanes. Second, as a number of previous 
analyses have shown (e.g., Joskow, 1973; Cummins and Weiss, 1991; and Grace, Klein and 
Kleindorfer, 1999), the market for homeowners insurance products is workably competitive.
4 
The basic demand problem for the homeowner is to select a single optimal policy from 
among the menu of policies offered in the market. This involves a complex tradeoff among the 
various attributes of the coverage and options purchased including price, the characteristics and 
needs of the homeowner, and the perceived quality of the companies from which coverage can 
be purchased. Demand in this market arises from the optimal consumer choice of a bundle of 
product and company attributes, given the personal characteristics of each homeowner and the 
economic and demographic characteristics of the neighborhood (i.e., Zip code) where he resides. 
The feasible set of such "bundled products" is the set of insurance policies, coverage options, and 
company attributes that can be sustained in a competitive equilibrium under certain regulatory 
constraints. 
The theoretical foundation for this demand analysis and the interacting market equilibrium is 
based on a model of price-quality competition (e.g., Gal-or, 1983). In a competitive market, the 
differences in what homeowners are willing to pay for various features will be reflected in the 
                                                 
3 Lenders typically require hazard insurance for homes with mortgages. It is possible that some homeowners without 
a mortgage have opted not to purchase insurance. We control for this using Census data (as of 1990) on the percent 
of homeowners having mortgages in each ZIP code represented in our sample. However, insurers typically require 
homeowner to insure 80 percent (or more) of the value of real estate (as the land is not insurable). It is quite possible 
that people might still have mortgage payments to make, but opt out of insuring because the mortgage is less than 20 
percent of the property's value. 
4 Indeed, the standard structural and performance benchmarks, such as concentration ratios and various financial 





price at which various bundled products with these features sell. Thus, what we model is 
essentially a regression of observed price in the market against various features of the products 
sold and the companies that sell them. We are interested in the factors that appear to influence 
demand and whether these factors appear reasonable on the basis of theory. At the outset, we rely 
on certain features of the homeowners insurance market in our modeling. While the structure of 
this market may be workably competitive, it is nonetheless a regulated market (Klein, 1998). On 
the demand side, this does not occasion any theoretical difficulties as the model we develop 
attempts only to explain, for policies actually offered in the market, how various features are 
valued, within the feature (e.g., various deductible levels) and across features (e.g., deductible 
level versus type of coverage). It is important to bear in mind that, because of regulation, the set 
of policies offered in the market, and their prices in particular, are not necessarily the result of a 
perfectly competitive market. 
We assume that the set of policies offered by companies, together with their underwriting 
and marketing strategies, are expected profit maximizing, subject to imposed regulatory 
constraints. This suggests that companies find the regulatory policies imposed not so onerous as 
to cause them to leave the market. Nonetheless, because of such policies, catastrophe coverages 
in some areas might require “underbracing” or cross subsidies from other lines of business, non-
catastrophe coverages and catastrophe coverages in other areas. These cross subsidies may be 
sustainable in equilibrium if they allow insurance companies to earn a reasonable rate of return 
on all lines of business and if they are supported by consumer preferences for certain feature 
bundles, other insurance products offered by an insurer, and insurer reputation. The continuation 




regulatory restrictions on terminating policies and other insurer and consumer considerations.
5 
Beyond the obvious implications for understanding rate adequacy and precision, this suggests the 
importance of detecting cross-marketing synergies in the demand and supply analysis and 
consumers’ preference for insurers with strong reputations. 
 
Defining Price and Modeling Demand for Homeowner Policies 
Assume that a particular homeowner, with characteristics Z (income, family status, type of 
structure, etc.), faces a choice among different policy options for insuring his home, where the 
set H gives the available policy options in the homeowners market. A typical such option "h" in 
the set H would be one offered by firm i (with characteristics Xi) with certain policy features 
such as deductible levels, loss settlement provisions (i.e., actual cash value or replacement cost), 
and premium P(h). The homeowner must choose one of the options in H and does so by 
maximizing his expected utility over the risks or gambles implied by each choice h. We represent 
this expected utility U(h, P(h)) in quasi-linear form
6 as: 
 
                    ( 1 )  
 
where V represents, for a consumer of type Z, the consumer's willingness to pay for various 
coverages or "features" of an insurance policy and F(h) represents the vector of such features, 
                                                 
5 See Bartlett, Klein and Russell (1999) for a discussion of how regulation-imposed insurance price subsidies may 
be sustained for a period of time. 
6  As Willig (1976) has shown, this form, with constant marginal utility of income, is appropriate for demand 
modeling when the good in question does not absorb a significant fraction of the homeowner’s budget, a reasonable 
assumption in the case of insurance (the typical homeowners insurance premium is around $300-$500 and somewhat 
higher in catastrophe-prone areas). This is not to say, of course, that there are no income effects across consumers, 
only that the marginal utility of income for each consumer can be reasonably assumed to be constant over the range 
of policy options offered. 
 




including the characteristics of the company offering the policy that may make a difference to 
consumers. Note that both V and P are shown to depend on only the vector of features F and the 
characteristics of the homeowner (possibly only the type of structure, but perhaps also such 
locational characteristics as fire/police protection and proximity to the ocean). This is without 
loss of generality since one of these features could itself be the premium level P(h). The 
homeowner then maximizes the function U(h, P(h), Z) over the set H. Assuming that the features 
can be more or less continuously varied (that is, there is a rich menu of policies available in the 
market), we can represent the choice problem as choosing an insurance policy by choosing 
optimal features of the policy. This leads to a solution to the homeowner's maximization problem 
characterized by Μ V/Μ Fi = Μ P/Μ Fi, which of course varies with consumer characteristics Z. 
From this logic, one can understand the structure of demand in this market by examining the 
structure of how premiums vary with policy features.
7 This leads to estimation problems of the 
following general type, neglecting for the moment the details here of functional form: 
 
                    ( 2 )  
 
where we have separated the policy features into categories: those pertaining to the policy itself 
(the vector F); those that pertain to the company (the vector X); and those pertaining to 
neighborhood characteristics (the vector Z). In this model, P(F, X, Z) could be either the total 
premium for a given policy or more likely, normalizing by units of coverage (e.g., the expected 
or indicated loss costs), premium per unit of coverage. 
"Price" for insurance products, as for other products and services, is defined on the basis of 
                                                 
7 Indeed, if V and P are estimated using bilinear or translog families of functions, then knowledge of one will lead 
(up to a constant of integration) to knowledge of the other. 




value-added per unit (in this case, per dollar) of output. At the policy level, this value-added 
measure of price can be captured by subtracting the discounted value of expected losses covered 
by the policy from the policy's premium.
8 Denoting by L(F, Z) the expected losses for a policy h 
with features F and by P(F, X, Z), its premium, we obtain the following definition of price p(F, 
X, Z) for a homeowners policy h = (F, X, Z) characterized by the parameters (F, X) and indexed 
by consumer and loss characteristics Z: 
 
                     ( 3 )  
 
where PV(L(F, Z)) = L(F, Z)/(1+r) is the present value of expected losses on the policy for the 
policy period and "r" is the insurer's return on equity for the period. L(F,Z) is the indicated loss 
costs per unit of coverage for the policy features (F) and structure (Z) in question. We will, in 
fact, directly estimate (3) using a functional form similar to (2). For the ISO database underlying 
this study, we have information on the premium charged for each policy (or group of identical 
policies), "r" is the average ratio of investment income to earned premiums for insurers, and L(F, 
Z) represents the advisory Indicated Loss Costs (ILC), as computed using ISO filed loss cost 
manuals and rules, for the policy characteristics (F, Z).
9 
We further analyze the Indicated Loss Costs. We employ our indicated loss costs as a 
                                                 
8 Note that we do not consider the effects of taxes in this model. See Myers and Cohn (1987) and Cummins (1990) 
for a more detailed discussion of “price” in the insurance context. See also Cummins, Weiss and Zi (1999) for a 
related empirical study of price and profitability using frontier efficiency methods. As noted in the latter paper, the 
definition of price in (3) properly accounts for the insurer’s expenses and the opportunity costs of the owner's capital 
invested in the insurance business. 
9 We discuss the ISO procedures briefly in Grace et. al., (1999) and in Grace et. al., (2000). For the moment, the 
reader should take these advisory Indicated Loss Costs as our best estimates of the expected annual costs resulting 
from policy features, structural characteristics and location of a property. The non-catastrophe portion of Indicated 
Loss Costs is based on actuarial experience and the catastrophe portion is based on catastrophe modeling results. As 
discussed below, the expected loss costs implied in individual insurers’ prices can vary from the ISO Indicated Loss 
Costs, which represent overall industry projected costs. Also, Indicated Loss Costs are not necessarily the same loss 
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measure of real insurance services output. Using ISO loss cost filing information, we calculated 
an expected indicated loss cost for each contract.
10 That is, ISO loss cost information can be used 
to determine the expected loss cost for a given homeowners policy form that covers a brick 
house in Zip code 30029 with certain specified coverage provisions, endorsements, and 
exclusions, such as ordinance/law coverage. ISO also has provided information on catastrophe 
loss costs and a non-catastrophe loss costs that we have applied to each possible combination of 
location, policy form, and additional contract terms.  
Indicated loss costs for a particular policy are an estimate of the expected claims costs 
(including claims adjustment expenses) of insurance coverage under the terms of that policy for a 
particular house. Thus, indicated loss costs are a proxy for the amount of insurance embodied in 
a specific policy. One could also employ the Coverage A limit as a proxy for the insurance 
embodied in a policy. However, while the Coverage A limit reflects the replacement cost of the 
home, it does not necessarily reflect the risk of loss to the home.
11 It is essentially the maximum 
possible insured loss rather than the expected loss.
12 We will therefore focus on indicated loss 
costs. 
Three demand equations will be estimated. The first is for the catastrophe coverage and the 
second is for the non-catastrophe coverage. The third is for both coverages combined, which we 
label “total coverage.”  These demand equations are all of the following general form: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
costs approved by regulators. 
10 ISO advisory loss costs filings and associated information present indicated, filed and implemented (i.e., 
approved) loss costs for a “base” policy and a number of rating factors and rules which effectively enable one to 
calculate a loss cost for a particular policy, reflecting a set of standard coverage and risk characteristics. 
11 Insurers typically require homeowners to insure at least 70-80 percent of the insured value of their home (e.g., its 
market value or replacement cost) and are reluctant to sell coverage significantly exceeding market value or 
replacement cost. Most insurers use a model or formula to estimate the market value or replacement cost of a home. 
12 Actually, the maximum expected loss encompasses the limits of all non-liability coverages minus deductibles, but 
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where  L(F,Z)i reflects the quantity demanded of real insurance services measured by the 
Indicated Loss Costs for catastrophe, non-catastrophe, or total coverage, F represents a vector of 
policy form terms, Z represents a vector of neighborhood characteristics, X represents a vector of 
company characteristics, and P represents price. 
These general forms of the Premium equation (2), the Price equation (3) and the Loss Cost 
equation (4) will serve as the basis for our estimation procedures. They incorporate both non-
catastrophe perils and catastrophe perils or windstorms. The reader may think of these simply as 
separate features of the policy in question. We are interested in identifying the effects of these 
factors in our empirical analysis. 
 
Hypotheses 
The received theory on factors influencing demand for insurance products is rich and long, 
both in terms of the rational consumer model (e.g., Arrow, 1971) as well as in behavioral and 
experimental studies of protective behavior (e.g., Kunreuther, 1998b). The basic theory 
recognizes that, through pooling, insurance provides a mechanism to reduce the volatility of 
losses at a price, the “risk premium” or loading, that risk-averse consumers are prepared to pay. 
Competition then assures that the coverages that are provided in the market are produced 
efficiently so as to minimize the total costs of providing such coverages, including the cost of the 
capital backing these policies. Behavioral and experimental studies of insurance underwriters and 
consumers (Kunreuther et al., 1995 and Kunreuther, 1996), however, show that both the supply 
                                                                                                                                                             




of and demand for insurance is more complicated in reality. This is especially true in areas like 
catastrophe insurance where understanding and evaluating the peril itself is more difficult. Thus, 
in what follows, we begin with the standard hypotheses derived from the normative theory based 
on risk pooling among risk-averse individuals, but we are prepared to encounter alternative 
behaviors. 
 
C.  Descriptive Statistics for Various Policies in Florida 
The basic contract features of the policies are summarized in Table 1. The HO3 policy is the 
typical contract sold. It has coverages for the home and attached structures, detached structures, 
personal property, loss of use, personal liability, and medical payments to others. There are also 
options (not shown in Table 1) to cover personal property at a greater value than the standard 
limits, or to cover liability at a greater level than the standard limit ($100,000), e.g., 10 percent of 
the home's insured value. The standard HO5 policy offers broader coverage than an HO3 policy. 
The standard HO3 policy provides named-perils coverage for personal property; the standard 
HO5 policy provides open-perils coverage on personal property. It is possible to purchase an 
HO15 endorsement on an HO3 policy to replicate the coverage provided by an HO5 policy – we 
treat the HO3/HO15 combination as an HO5 policy. The third most relevant policy form HO8 
covers a more limited set of named perils than HO3 policies. HO1 policies (sold in only a few 
states including New York) are similar to the HO8 policy, but do not cover personal property. 
The HO2 policy is more akin to the HO3 policy but does not cover personal property. 
For appropriate policy forms, consumers can choose to purchase actual cash value or 




as an endorsement on HO3 policies while it is a standard coverage in HO5 policies.
13 Finally, 
there is a wind device protection credit that consumers in Florida can obtain if they have installed 
specified mitigation features, such as storm shutters or roof straps.
14 
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics on the various contracts in Florida and New York 
during the period 1995-1998. These data are not summarized by company or Zip Code and 
consist of the initial set of observations constructed from the contract-level data. We see that 
HO3 contracts make up the majority of contracts written in both states. Overall, HO3 contracts 
account for approximately 92 percent of all contracts written in Florida by our sample 
companies. The other policy forms account for the remainder of the transactions sampled. In 
New York, the same pattern is evident where HO3 is the most common contract. HO3 polices 
account for 71.9 percent followed by HO2 polices which account for 20.3 percent. 
In both Florida and New York, the average premium (total premiums divided by insured 
house years) by policy form increases with the scope of coverage. This makes intuitive sense. 
Further, the average price varies by policy form.
15 The average price decreases as the scope of 
coverage increases. This is what one would expect as there are certain fixed expenses in 
servicing a given policy that would not increase as the underlying loss cost increases. 
 
 
                                                 
13 Ordinance or Law Coverage will upgrade a rebuilt house after a covered loss to the current building code. Without 
the coverage, the house will be "repaired" or rebuilt according to code only as long as doing so does not exceed the 
Coverage A limit on the policy. 
14 HO-8 policies cover a more limited set of perils than other policy forms and theft coverage is restricted to 
property on the premises with a limit of $1,000. Also, as HO8 policies are often written on old homes, the insurer 
agrees to repair or replace a damaged home with materials of like kind and quality but not necessarily original 
materials or special workmanship such as plaster walls or intricate wooden moldings. 
15 We actually use PRICE1 = 1 + PRICE = [(1+r)(Premiums – Indicated Loss Costs)]/[Indicated Loss Costs] as our 




III. Demand Estimation for Homeowners Insurance Policies 
 
In this section we estimate the demand for homeowners insurance in Florida using two-stage 
least squares regression for New York and Florida. We estimate the demand at the level of the 
Zip code rather than the individual. We have individual contract data, but the market in which 
the consumer makes purchases is larger than the "home." This means that some homeowners 
may shop for insurance and that the demographic characteristics of a consumer’s neighborhood 
(in addition to the consumer's home characteristics) may influence the type of insurance he 
purchases. Because we have the Zip code location of the insured house and we have access to 
Zip code level information from the Census, we assume, for now, that a consumer shops in a 
market defined by his Zip code.
16 
A second problem is that the demand for homeowners insurance is derived from the demand 
for housing. We account for the demand for housing by including the value of the insurance 
contract’s coverage A limit, which reflects the value of the individual’s house as an endogenous 
variable. Factors expected to influence housing demand include such Zip code characteristics as 
median income and Census reported housing characteristics, and these factors are used as 
instrumental variables in our two-stage least squares estimation below. 
Tables A.1-A.3 in the appendix to this paper provide a list of the potential (F, X, Z) variables 
available for use in this analysis. Note that Table A.1 contains both information specific to the 
policy issued as well as to the type of structure insured. It also includes certain structural and 
protection features of the structure and the community in which it is located. The information in 
Table A.1 is generally available for nearly 900,000 house-years in Florida, 220,000 house-years 
for each of the four years studied. However, we have a smaller set of usable data. In Florida, we 
                                                 




have approximately usable 663,500 house years over the four-year period that are aggregated to 
approximately 43,000 unique observations by firm and Zip Code. Some data are excluded due to 
incompatible records, the generation of new Zip codes over the reporting period (making their 
integration with collateral Census data difficult), and missing information on some records. For 
New York, there are 2,335,000 house years. When these data are aggregated to the firm and Zip 
code level, it results in approximately 70,000 unique observations. 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for Florida (Panel A) and for New York (Panel B) 
based on the data used in our econometric analysis. Note that average premiums and loss costs 
are higher in Florida than in New York. Also, as in Table 2, the measure of price (Price+1) is 
greater in New York than in Florida. In addition to the effect of fixed expenses (in relation to 
increasing loss costs), greater rate suppression and compression in Florida could contribute to its 
lower average price mark-up. 
 
A. Estimation of Quantity Demand  
Table 4 shows the results of our two-stage least squares estimation of the demand for 
contracts for homeowners insurance in Florida. In this estimation, we employed the indicated 
loss costs (in the logged form) as our proxy of the quantity of insurance demanded. We also 
employed PRICE1 in the logged form as our proxy for price. In the model shown in Table 4, we 
estimate several endogenous variables. PRICE1 is estimated as an endogenous variable, which is 
standard for demand models. We also account for several other endogenous variables including 
house value, deductibles, and the choice to invest in wind protection devices. 
We estimate the demand for catastrophe coverage separately from the demand for non-
catastrophe coverage. We have estimated the catastrophe portion of indicated loss costs for each 
                                                                                                                                                             




policy in the sample.
17 ISO employed Risk Management Services (RMS) and its CAT model to 
develop these costs. In addition, we have ISO-estimated non-catastrophe indicated loss costs that 
are based on standard actuarial analysis of historical data and cost trends. Thus, we can think of 
the homeowners’ policy as a joint (or bundled) product where the coverage for the catastrophe 
peril and the coverage for non-catastrophe perils are typically but not always combined in the 
same contract. Further, consumers can vary or tradeoff the amounts of their catastrophe coverage 
and non-catastrophe coverage in their choice of coverage provisions. By estimating the two 
demands separately, we are acknowledging that different factors may affect the demands for 
insurance for these two sets of perils. 
Before discussing the regression results in general, there are two sets of coefficients to 
highlight. The first is the price elasticity of demand. The coefficient on the log of PRICE1 
(Column 1) for the total demand equation is –1.411. This is somewhat elastic. However, if we 
decompose the price sensitivity of demand for catastrophe coverage, shown in Column 4, we see 
that it is even more elastic with an estimated coefficient of –2.873. In contrast, the price elasticity 
for non-catastrophe coverage (Column 9) is approximately -0.41, which is inelastic. We see this 
same pattern in Table 5 for the New York results. However, in general, the demand for total 
insurance and its components is less price elastic in New York than in Florida. 
We also employ a selection variable to test for differences between our sample insurers and 
other insurers in the market. One question that could be raised about our analysis is whether the 
companies in our database are representative of all insurers selling homeowners insurance in 
Florida and New York. In our sample, we have 60 companies in the sample over the four years. 
                                                 
17 The decomposition of the non-catastrophe and catastrophe portions of indicated loss costs has become a standard 
feature of advisory loss cost filings and insurer pricing. The term “cat loading” is sometimes used to characterize the 
catastrophe component of the expected loss cost. Because catastrophes occur infrequently, modeling techniques 




In Florida, over the time period we study, this represents about 30 percent of the total 
homeowners' premiums written in each year. In New York, the ISO Reporting firms write about 
35 percent of the market. The firms in our sample may be significantly different than the other 
firms in the market. We control for this probability by estimating a probit regression that 
attempts to classify those companies that are in our sample, i.e., they are companies that report 
data to ISO and not other statistical agents.
18 This selection model employs firm specific 
characteristics to determine whether the firm is an "ISO Reporter."
19 
From this regression, we obtain the inverse Mills ratio for each observation as 
) ' ( / ) ' ( β β φ λ X X Φ − =  from the estimates of the probit regression where φ (*) represents the 
normal density function and   Φ (∗)  represents the cumulative normal distribution function (see 
Green, 2000). This variable can then be employed in the demand equation to account for the fact 
that some firms report to ISO and others do not. In our model, the coefficient on λ   in the demand 
equation represents the effect on the quantity demanded for a firm that reports data to ISO. If the 
coefficient is positive (negative), then the mean level of demand is higher (lower) relative to 
firms who do not report to ISO all other things being equal. 
For our Florida results in Table 4, the selection indicator (λ)   is significantly negative for 
catastrophe coverage, thus implying that the ISO Reporting companies are less likely to provide 
catastrophe coverage than those that do not report to the ISO. Thus, the mean level of insurance 
                                                 
18 In Florida and New York, regulators require insurers to report statistical data to one of several designated 
statistical agents. ISO and the National Association of Independent Insurers (NAII) are the two principal statistical 
agents; other statistical agents account for only a small portion of insurers operating in these markets. An increasing 
number of insurers have selected ISO as their statistical agent, which has broadened the types of insurers in its 
database. At the same time, among the ISO reporting firms, several declined to authorize the use of their data for this 
study. These tended to be insurers with more unique products and portfolios of exposures. 
19 The regression we estimate is: Probit [(ISO Reporter and Participant) =1, 0 otherwise] = f(log of total assets, log 
of Florida homeowners premiums, Best Capital Adequacy Ratio, business concentration ratio (top four lines), 
geographical four state concentration ratio, percent of claims paid within two years, percent of claim value paid 




demanded is statistically “lower” for reporting companies than non-reporting companies.
20 In 
Table 5, we see the same result for New York - the selection parameter is significant only for 
catastrophe demand. However, while significant, these coefficients do not appear to be 
economically important. 
 
B. Florida  
Insured Risk Characteristics 
In estimating the effect of the type of construction on demand, superior fire resistant homes 
(SFR) are treated as the “base case” in our specification of dummy variables (i.e., there is no 
dummy variable for SFR homes) to avoid multicollinearity with dummy variables for wooden 
frame construction and the brick/masonry construction. A priori, one would expect demand to be 
lower for the SFR category if fire risk was a major component of the demand for insurance. 
Thus, we would hypothesize that consumers with wooden frame homes would have a higher 
demand for insurance than consumers with SFR homes. This is supported by our results as the 
percentage of homes with wooden frame construction in a Zip code is positively related to the 
overall demand for coverage. Further, we see that this relationship is strong and significant for 
non-catastrophe coverage but insignificant for catastrophe coverage. This suggests that SFR 
homes do not tend to have characteristics that would significantly decrease their vulnerability to 
windstorm damage. 
For brick construction, we see no significant relationship for the overall demand, but we see 
a positive relationship for both catastrophe and non-catastrophe equations suggesting that, 
relative to owners of SFR homes, owners of brick homes tend to have a higher demand for both 
                                                 





catastrophe and non-catastrophe coverages. 
The protection code is the ISO designated rating of the local community’s fire and police 
protection. A higher code means the protection level is lower and implies that risk is higher. 
Consistent with this, we see in our statistical results that as the protection code increases (public 
services are of lower quality), the demand for insurance increases. 
 
Contract Terms 
In addition to price, there are a number of other variables that reflect various contract 
choices. The first is policy type. Recall that the HO5 policy offers the broadest coverage (omitted 
to avoid multicollinearity) and should be the most preferred, all other things equal including 
price. If HO5 polices are preferred to all other policies, then there should be negative coefficients 
on the percentages of HO3 and HO8 polices in a Zip code. Our results are partially consistent 
with this hypothesis as the percentage of HO3 policies in a Zip is negatively related to the 
demand for coverage. This is true across the various types of coverage, catastrophe, non-
catastrophe and combined. However, our estimations yield a positive coefficient for the 
percentage of HO8 policies in the total demand equation; this relationship is negative for 
catastrophe coverage and positive for non-catastrophe coverage. This implies that, for 
catastrophe coverage, the HO5 policy is preferable, all other things held constant. For non-
catastrophe coverage, we see that HO8 is again positively related to the demand for coverage. 
One possible explanation for this result is that HO8 policies tend to be written in older urban 
neighborhoods where the risk of non-catastrophe perils such as fire and theft can be very high. 
In Florida, insureds can elect to have coverage for windstorms excluded from their policy 




would expect that a wind exclusion would negatively affect demand. However, our results yield 
a positive coefficient for this variable suggesting that it has a positive effect on demand. This is 
true for both the catastrophe coverage and non-catastrophe coverage and may be due to the fact 
that the Zips with a high percentage of excluded polices are in higher risk Zip codes. Arguably, 
the demand for insurance should be stronger in these areas, all other things equal. Consequently, 
our wind exclusion variable may be picking up the effect of omitted variables reflecting this 
higher risk and demand that are visible to insurers and insureds but not researchers. 
If consumers value policy options such as replacement cost coverage, then the addition of 
these options should be associated with higher levels of demand if the benefits of the options 
outweigh their incremental cost to consumers. We see this is true for ordinance or law coverage, 
but not for replacement cost coverage on personal property. Ordinance or law coverage is a 
policy option that will pay the additional costs of repairing a home to the standards of any new 
ordinances or building codes that have been enacted since the home was built. This is not 
surprising as Florida has significantly strengthened its building codes since Hurricane Andrew 
occurred, increasing the value of this additional coverage for homeowners. 
The regression coefficient on replacement cost coverage is negative for overall demand, 
which implies that consumers do not value it as much. However, its coefficient is positive in the 
non-catastrophe demand equation and negative in the catastrophe demand equation. This implies 
that this policy option is valued more for catastrophe perils than for non-catastrophe perils. 
Indeed, being able to replace property damaged from fire or loss through theft may be of 
significant concern to homeowners, whereas repairing structural damage may be the principal 
concern with respect to the wind peril.
21 
                                                 
21 Indeed, in areas with a high catastrophe risk (and high catastrophe loadings in the coast of insurance), insureds 




The Coverage A limit (on the dwelling and attached structures) is our proxy for the 
replacement cost of the home and is treated as an endogenous variable.
22 One would expect that 
insurance demand would increase as the replacement cost of the home increases, all other things 
held constant. Our statistical results are consistent with this expectation. As the value of the 
home (Coverage A limit) increases, the quantity of insurance demanded increases. In fact, this is 
almost a unit elastic relationship. A 10 percent increase in the Coverage A limit yields a 10 
percent increase in the quantity of insurance demanded. 
The fire and wind deductibles are also endogenously determined. Higher deductibles may 
increase or decrease the demand for insurance. First, as the deductible increases, the price should 
fall causing the demand for insurance to increase. In fact, the homeowner may use the premium 
savings to purchase additional coverages that are considered to be a better “value”, such as 
higher policy limits. Indeed, trading higher deductibles for higher limits is commonly advised by 
insurance experts.
23 Second, an offsetting result can occur. As the deductible increases, the value 
of the coverage decreases and the consumer has to bear more risk. Thus, the sign of the 
deductible’s coefficient gives us some indication which effect is more important: the price effect 
or the coverage effect. 
For the wind deductible, we see that the coefficient on the overall demand is negative. This 
implies that the coverage effect dominates. Increases in the deductible reduce the demand for 
insurance all other things held constant. However, if we look at the coefficient in Column 5, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
coverage for catastrophe losses. 
22 As mentioned earlier, insurers typically require a homeowner to carry a Coverage A limit equal to at least 70-80 
percent of the replacement cost of his home. Limits on the other property coverages are stated as percentages of the 
Coverage A limit. Further, the problem of inadequate coverage limits has received increasing attention and has 
probably prompted insureds and insurers to maintain coverage limits closer to the replacement cost of homes. 
23 The expense load and price mark-up on lower deductibles are very high. Insureds likely become increasingly 
attuned to this as their premium increases, as revealed by a significant increase in the size of the deductibles chosen 
by policyholders in Florida and New York between 1995 and 1998 (see Grace et. al., 2001). For example, in Florida 




see that it is positive implying consumers would take a higher deductible for catastrophe 
coverage because the price effect dominates. Higher deductibles imply lower prices and this 
encourages consumers to purchase more insurance. This is plausible as consumers facing greater 
catastrophe risk may be more concerned about having adequate coverage to cover large losses 
than absorbing a larger deductible in the event of a hurricane.
24 For the non-catastrophe 
coverage, the wind deductible is negative, indicating that the coverage effect dominates. This is 
also plausible as non-catastrophe perils tend to involve more frequent and smaller losses. 
For the fire deductible, we see the opposite phenomenon for two of our three demand 
functions. The coefficient on the fire deductible in the total demand equation is positive implying 
that the increase in the deductible lowers price and thus increases demand. For catastrophe 
coverage, the relationship is also positive and significant. Catastrophes are not fire related (at 
least not in Florida) and thus the fire deductible’s price effect dominates for catastrophe 
coverage. In Column 9, we see that, for non-catastrophe coverage, the coefficient on the fire 
deductible is negative, suggesting that coverage effect dominates the price effect in the demand 
for non-catastrophe coverage. 
Finally, we treat the decision to employ a windstorm protection device such as storm 
shutters as endogenous. There is no a priori hypothesis regarding the effect of this variable on 
the demand for insurance. If the presence of protection devices increases demand for insurance, 
then the protection devices are complements to traditional insurance. In contrast, if there is a 
negative relationship between the presence of the protection devices and insurance demand, then 
one might reasonably conclude that the devices were a substitute for traditional insurance. Our 
coefficient results are positive across the demand models implying that the windstorm device 
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credit is associated with higher insurance demand, all other things held constant. 
 
Neighborhood Characteristics and Regulation 
The first neighborhood characteristic is the ratio of implemented loss costs to indicated loss 
costs. This also may be viewed as a regulatory variable in that regulators tend to vary the severity 
of price constraints by rating territory. Because regulators seek to keep insurance “affordable”, 
their constraints are more severe or binding in higher-cost areas (see Grace et. al., 2001). The 
implemented loss costs are those costs that the regulator allows to be used in making full rate 
calculations for homeowners’ policies in a given rating territory. As mentioned previously, we 
think of this ratio as a measurement of rate suppression or rate compression.
25 As the 
implemented loss costs are reduced by regulation (relative to the expected or indicated loss costs) 
the consumer gets a lower price for coverage. As the ratio increases, the price reduction 
diminishes. Thus one would expect that a higher ratio would reduce the demand for coverage. As 
regulatory price suppression is reduced, price rises, and as price rises, the quantity demanded 
falls. In fact, we find this to be the case for all three demand functions. 
Older homes tend to be higher risk and one would expect that their owners would have a 
higher demand for coverage, all other things equal. Our results are consistent with this - as the 
median year of a home’s construction in a Zip code increases (i.e., it is a newer home), the 
demand for coverage falls. This is true for all three Florida demand models. 
The percentage of homes with a mortgage may have either a positive or a negative effect. 
                                                                                                                                                             
this viewed as one of several effective strategies to manage an insurer’s catastrophe exposure. 
25 We define “rate suppression” as a binding regulatory ceiling on the overall rate level charged by an insurer. “Rate 
compression” is defined as a binding regulatory constraint on the rate differential between low and high-risk 
territories. In practice, regulators tend to both compress and suppress rates by imposing severe constraints on the 
rates for the highest-risk territories, without a compensating increase in the rates for low-risk territories to produce 




Mortgage lenders generally require homeowners insurance to complete the mortgage transaction. 
This implies that the greater the percentage of homes with mortgages, the greater the demand for 
insurance. However, while borrowers must meet certain insurance coverage requirements, they 
are not required to purchase the broadest coverage available. Further, consumers may scrimp on 
their insurance if they have low equity (which could also increase their mortgage payments). 
This moral hazard phenomenon may result in a negative coefficient on the percentage of homes 
in a Zip code with a mortgage. Another reason that the percentage of homes with a mortgage 
may be negatively related to the demand for insurance may involve an owner’s tenure in a home. 
Mortgages are paid off over time, but consumers do not necessarily update their insurance 
coverage each year. Thus, in Zip codes with a higher percentage of mortgages, it may be that 
those who have been in their house a long time have a lower demand for coverage, everything 
else held constant. 
We see that in Florida the percentage of mortgages in a Zip code is negatively related to the 
total demand for insurance. This relationship is positive for catastrophe coverage but negative for 
non-catastrophe coverage. This suggests that, for non-catastrophe coverage, the moral hazard 
explanation and/or “tenure effect” dominates the decision to purchase insurance. However, it is 
interesting to see that as the percentage of mortgages increases in a Zip code, the demand for 
catastrophe coverage increases. It is not clear why the moral hazard effect and/or the tenure 
effect should be that different between the demands for catastrophe and non-catastrophe 
coverages. One possibility is that lenders impose greater insurance requirements for homes 
subject to greater catastrophe risk. 
We further examine the relationship between having a mortgage and the demand for 




for homes with mortgages (in the Zip code) to the median income in the Zip.
26 The higher this 
ratio, the tighter is a homeowner’s budget constraint on non-housing expenditures. A positive 
relationship between this ratio and demand would imply that, while cash poor, the homeowner 
wishes to avoid default on his mortgage (due to uninsured losses) and thus will purchase more 
insurance. A negative coefficient would imply that consumers attempt to scrimp on their 
insurance coverage as they have less money to spend on non-housing items. Our results yield a 
positive coefficient for the housing cost/income ratio in all three demand functions. This suggests 
that homeowners’ aversion to risk and default dominates over concerns about having to 
economize on non-housing items. We should also note that high housing costs relative to income 
may reflect the importance of housing to a consumer and this could also increase the demand for 
insurance. 
A second variable is the ratio of mortgage costs to the median home value. This is a measure 
of a homeowner’s leverage, i.e., higher mortgage payments relative to home value imply less 
equity. As leverage increases, one would expect a reduced incentive to purchase insurance. In 
Florida, we see that the coefficient on this ratio is positive in the total demand equation. This 
suggests that as the ratio of mortgage costs to home value increases (i.e., leverage increases), the 
demand for insurance increases. However, if we look at the demand for catastrophe coverage, we 
see a large and significantly negative coefficient on the ratio of mortgage costs to home value. 
This implies that, at least for catastrophe coverage, that high leverage is associated with lower 
insurance demand. 
A plausible story emerges from these results. Cash-strapped homeowners who place a high 
value on their housing may be primarily concerned with avoiding uninsured losses and negative 
credit ratings that would arise from default on their mortgage or other debts. On the other hand, 
                                                 




all other things equal, highly leveraged homeowners (rich or poor), may be inclined to take their 
chances on incurring uninsured losses from a low-probability event that could force them to 
default on their mortgage. 
There is no a prior expectation on the sign of the coefficient for the average age of the 
population in a Zip code. On the one hand, families with young children may tend to be more 
risk averse and have a higher demand for insurance. On the other hand, young single 
homeowners may be less risk averse than older homeowners. Other factors associated with age 
and risk aversion may confound the relationship between age and the demand for insurance we 
observe. Some elderly homeowners may be very risk averse, while others may be less concerned 
about the risk of financial losses because of a shorter time horizon or greater assets. In our 
results, we see that the coefficient for the age variable is negative for overall demand and for 
non-catastrophe demand. However, it is positive for catastrophe demand. 
Since Florida is a retirement state, it is appropriate to look at the effect that the percentage of 
retirees may have on the demand for insurance. We proxy retirees in the Zip code by the number 
of people 65 years old or older. If we look at the total demand equation, we see a negative 
relationship between retirees and demand and it appears to be arising from the catastrophe 
related demand. The coefficient for catastrophe coverage is negative, but it is positive for non-
catastrophe coverage demand. On a superficial level, this implies that retirees’ do not value 
catastrophe coverage relative to non-catastrophe coverage. This may be due to a shorter time 
horizon for future consumption decisions and the low probability of a severe hurricane occurring 
in the near future. 
The percentage of households in urban areas should be related to insurance demand. This is 




valued, then more urban households should have a negative effect on the demand for insurance. 
If they are higher risk, then the relationship may be positive. Note that the coastal areas in 
Florida tend to have the highest population concentrations because of their attractiveness to 
retirees, tourists and others. We see that in Florida, the percentage of urban households is 
negatively related to overall demand. This is also true for the demand for non-catastrophe 
coverage, but the urban coefficient is positive for catastrophe coverage. This suggests that the 
“low value effect” dominates in the demand for non-catastrophe coverage and the urban-
catastrophe risk association dominates in the demand for catastrophe coverage. 
Finally, we examine income. The expected sign on and the magnitude of the coefficient for 
income is ambiguous because of two competing hypotheses. First, insurance may be thought of 
as an inferior good. If the coefficient on income is negative it implies that increases in income 
reduce the demand for insurance. Arrow (1964) conjectured that individuals have declining 
absolute risk aversion. This implies that as income increases the demand for insurance should 
diminish. Mossin (1968), in turn, proved that if a person faced a price of insurance greater than 
the actuarially fair value, but below the price at which no insurance would be purchased, and the 
consumer exhibited decreasing absolute risk aversion, then the amount of insurance coverage fell 
as wealth increased. Mossin did not consider the case where higher incomes might generate more 
assets at risk and thus the higher income person would have greater losses to insure against. This 
yields the alternative hypothesis that income could have a positive coefficient in the insurance 
demand equation. 
Further, Briys, Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1989) have pointed out that the income demand 
elasticity for insurance will be positive if and only if absolute risk aversion does not decrease 




minimal bound. Cleeton and Zellner (1993) undertake a similar analysis and operationalize Briys 
et al.￿s conclusion slightly differently. They find that the income elasticity of demand for 
insurance will be positive over all prices if φa + η > 1 where φa is the elasticity of relative risk 
aversion to initial income and η is the elasticity of the amount at risk with respect to initial 
income. This implies that if potential losses change as wealth changes (which makes sense in our 
case as wealthier people may buy more expensive houses, exposing themselves to higher 
potential losses), we may see a positive relationship between income and insurance purchased.  
Our estimated coefficients on income are positive, but relatively inelastic. This implies one 
of two things. First, while we control for housing value, we may not be capturing all of the 
relationships between higher incomes and higher demand for housing. Alternatively, the positive 





In Florida, consumers tend to buy coverage from direct writers and stock companies. We 
included auto premiums written by the insured’s homeowners company to account for some 
potential consumer transactions costs savings from dealing with one insurer. We find that the 
coefficient on the auto premiums written is negative which implies that consumers do not value 
this particular combination even though it is customary for companies to provide discounts for 
multiple polices with the company. Surprisingly, we see a positive relationship for life premiums 
written by a sister company. Again, we conjecture that consumers would like the ability to deal 
                                                 
27 We estimated a regression between the log of the median home value and the log of income holding other things 
constant such as the characteristics of the house, insurance prices, and neighborhood characteristics constant. The 
elasticity of median house value with respect to income, our measure of η, was estimated to be 1.04. Thus, as long as 




with one insurance company. We see some evidence of this for the demand for total coverage 
and the demand for catastrophe coverage. 
The size of the company is also a proxy for its soundness, reputation and/or its ability to 
achieve economies of scale. Our conjecture here is that larger companies are financially stronger 
and are able to take advantage of economies of scale. What we see is that for our sample 
companies, that company size has a negative effect on overall demand and non-catastrophe 
demand. It is only for the catastrophe coverage that we see a positive relationship between firm 
size and the demand for insurance. It may be that consumers place greater value on firm size in 
purchasing catastrophe coverage because large insurers are perceived to be better able to absorb 
catastrophe losses.
28 
Another indication of firm solvency quality is its A.M. Best Rating. In this model, the A+ 
and higher category is the omitted category. If a high rating is valuable, then each of the other 
rating coefficients should be negative. If consumers favor lower prices over greater financial 
strength, then we might see negative coefficients on all of the higher ratings and a positive 
coefficient on the lower ratings. 
In fact, we see in Table 5 that the lower rated companies tend to be associated with higher 
levels of demand. That is consumers do not value additional solvency safety in determining how 
much overall insurance and non-catastrophe insurance they purchase. On the other hand, if we 
look at catastrophe demand, we see that the rating of A is positive. That suggests that consumers 
prefer A rated companies above all A+ or higher rated companies. We also see that for the rating 
categories of A- and B+, the coefficients are negative. This implies that, for catastrophe demand, 
consumers prefer higher-rated companies over firms with these lower ratings. Hence, it may be 
                                                                                                                                                             
insurance purchased. 




that consumers do not value the incremental difference in quality between the highest and next 
highest rated insurers, but are more reluctant to purchase insurance from insurers rated in the 
lower tiers. In other words, consumers prefer a company with at least a “good” rating, but not 
necessarily a superior rating if they are required to pay a higher price for superior financial 
strength. 
The company with a NR2 rating appears to be an anomaly. Category NR2 is a not rated 
category. There was one firm in the date set with an NR2 rating and the reason the firm was not 
rated was due to fact that the company started operation right after Hurricane Andrew, thus A.M. 
Best did not have the ability to properly rate the company. This firm is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of an A++ rated company. Thus, the company is not exactly a high-risk firm. 
Currently, it holds an A rating from A.M. Best. In light of these facts, if we look at the 
catastrophe demand, we see that consumers value a strong company, but not necessarily the 
strongest company. 
Examining the non-catastrophe demand wee see a stronger demand for lower rated 
companies and the NR2 company. Again, the NR2 company, while not really a low rated 
company, is still not a high rated company. Thus, consumers may choose price over quality when 
it comes to non-catastrophe coverage where there is less of a concern that an insurer will become 
insolvent. We should note that while the existence of guaranty fund coverage is not widely 
publicized, consumers may still believe that they will receive some protection from an insurer’s 
insolvency, which would lessen the value they place on financial strength. The moral hazard 
effects of guaranty fund coverage have received considerable attention in the insurance 
economics literature (see Cummins, 1988 for example) and we explore this further in the last part 





C. New York 
We also estimated demand equations for New York to see how different market and 
regulatory conditions affect our findings. Coastal areas of New York, such as Long Island, face a 
moderate degree of catastrophe risk. Regulatory constraints on insurers’ rates appear to have 
been less severe in New York because cost pressures have been more moderate (see Grace et. al., 
2001). We would not expect the risk of non-catastrophe perils in urban areas to be eclipsed by 
catastrophe risk as in Florida. We employ similar demand models in our analysis of the New 
York market, with some small adjustments to reflect coverage options specific to New York. 
 
Insured Risk Characteristics 
For New York in Table 5, we do see some differences compared to the results we obtained 
for Florida. Relative to superior fire resistant structures, owners of brick homes have a 
significantly lower demand and owners of wood frame construction have a higher demand for 
total insurance. We also see that owners of wood frame homes have a higher demand for 
catastrophe coverage, but owners of brick homes have a lower demand for non-catastrophe 
coverage. The reason for the negative effect of brick homes (relative to SFR homes) is not 
immediately obvious – it is possible that owners of SFR homes are more risk averse and 
purchase more insurance as well as make other investments to lower risk. Further, as in Florida, 
as the level of public protection services declines, the demand for insurance increases. 
 
Contract Terms 




policies have negative coefficients implying that they are not valued as highly as HO5 polices. 
This pattern with respect to policy form is true across the different demand models and 
consistent with what one would expect. 
Replacement cost coverage on personal property and ordinance or law coverage both have 
positive signs suggesting that consumers do value these additional policy options. However, we 
do see that that the coefficient on ordinance or law coverage is negative for catastrophe demand 
implying that, for this coverage, ordinance or law coverage does not add sufficient value for the 
consumer to offset its higher cost. We should note that the problem of substandard construction 
and the need to strengthen building codes have not been issues in New York, unlike the case in 
Florida. As in Florida, we see that the Coverage A limit is positively related to the demand for 
insurance. This is true for both catastrophe and non-catastrophe coverages. 
The coefficients on the wind and fire deductibles differ from the coefficients estimated for 
Florida. Overall, increases in the fire deductible are related to a lower demand for insurance, 
while increases in the wind deductible are related to higher levels of demand. Looking at the 
catastrophe and non-catastrophe results, however, we see the wind deductible is negatively 
related to the demand for catastrophe coverage. This implies that for catastrophe coverage in 
New York, the coverage effect dominates the price effect for the wind deductible. The same is 
true for the fire deductible for catastrophe coverage. 
When we examine the relationships of wind and fire deductibles to the demand for non-
catastrophe coverage, we see that the coefficient on wind is positive and the coefficient on fire is 
negative. This contrasts with the results for catastrophe demand in New York and with the 
corresponding Florida coefficients. This is likely due to the fact that the expected amount of 




Finally, New York also allows homeowners policies to exclude off premises theft coverage. 
This exclusion should reduce the price of insurance. One would expect a positive effect on 
demand for this exclusion if consumers preferred the exclusion given the resulting premium 
discount (or alternatively did not value the coverage enough to pay the higher cost). What we see 
is that the coefficient on the exclusion variable has a positive sign, implying that consumers 
opting for the exclusion purchase more insurance, all other things equal. This makes sense as it 
suggests that consumers who exclude off premises losses can use the premium savings to expand 
other coverages. This may be especially attractive to owners of homes in high-risk urban areas. 
 
Neighborhood Characteristics and Regulation 
Looking at the regulatory subsidy variable - the ratio of the implemented loss costs to the 
indicated loss costs (our measure of price suppression) - we generally obtained the same results 
we obtained in Florida. That is, as the ratio increased, prices were allowed to rise closer to their 
market level and the demand for insurance decreased. Note again that rate suppression and 
compression in Florida was much more severe than in New York. This could explain why the 
subsidy effect is smaller in New York. Note for a given ratio, the amount of the subsidy in 
Florida would be higher because loss costs and premiums are considerably higher in Florida. 
The median year of construction is expected to be negatively related to the demand for 
insurance. The relationship between the year of construction and total insurance demand is not 
statistically significant. For catastrophe demand, the relationship is positive and significant, but 
small in magnitude. This could be caused by greater new home construction in coastal areas. 
The percentage of homes with mortgages is positively related to the demand for insurance 




demand equation. As we suggest for Florida, lenders may impose more stringent insurance 
requirements in areas subject to coastal windstorms. 
The pattern for the two measures related to mortgage costs and leverage (the ratio of 
mortgage costs to income and the ratio of mortgage costs to home value) exhibit a different 
pattern than in Florida. The measure of the tightness of the budget constraint is not statistically 
significant in the total demand equation. However, for the catastrophe demand and non-
catastrophe demand equations, the coefficients for this variable are significantly negative. This 
implies that, as their budgets becomes tighter, consumers demand less insurance, all other things 
held constant. For the second leverage ratio, the estimated coefficient is not statistically 
significant in the total demand equation, but is significantly positive in the catastrophe and non-
catastrophe demand equations, which differs somewhat from our Florida results. It is possible 
that the high price of land in certain areas of New York counteracts any moral hazard effect 
associated with higher leverage.
29 
Age appears to affect only the demand for catastrophe coverage. This contrasts with what 
we found for Florida. Also, the percentage of people over age 65 affects demand differently in 
New York than in Florida. For the total and catastrophe demand equations this variable is 
significantly positive, but it is not statistically significant in the non-catastrophe demand 
equation. It is possible that elderly homeowners in more catastrophe-prone areas in New York 
have greater reason to secure their homes for themselves and their heirs. 
In addition, the percentage of homes in urban areas is positively related to overall demand 
and the demand for catastrophe coverage, reflecting the increased risk level of urban homes. As 
in Florida, coastal areas in New York tend to be heavily developed. 
                                                 
29 The greater the value of the land, the greater the incentive of an owner to avoid foreclosure if his home is 




Finally, we see that in New York, insurance is an inferior good. As income increases, the 
demand for total coverage and non-catastrophe coverage decreases. In contrast, income increases 
the demand for catastrophe coverage. 
 
Firm Characteristics 
In New York, the type of distribution system used by an insurer does not appear to affect the 
demand for insurance. Direct writers may have a greater edge in insurance markets that are 
growing more rapidly, such as Florida’s. The demand for total coverage and non-catastrophe 
coverage appears to be lower for stock insurers than mutuals. It may be that well-established 
mutual insurers in New York have retained considerable customer loyalty. Further, the ability to 
purchase home and other insurance coverages from the same company does not appear to affect 
demand. 
We also see that in New York firm size does seem to be positively related to the demand for 
both catastrophe coverage and total, but is negatively related to non-catastrophe demand. This 
makes some sense in that catastrophes are more likely to stress a small insurer than non-
catastrophe losses. 
In New York, there are only three categories of A.M. Best company ratings in the data set 
(A+ and higher, A, and A-). The category of A+ and higher is omitted. We see that for the 
overall demand, there are no significant differences among the rating categories, but if we look at 
the catastrophe demand equation we see that the two lower categories are preferred to the A+ 
category. The opposite is true for the non-catastrophe equation. In this case, A+ and higher is the 
preferred rating. This contrasts with the Florida results and may be due to the fact that we do not 
have a sufficient dispersion of quality among firms in New York to produce reliable estimates of 
                                                                                                                                                             




the effects of quality. Another explanation is that consumers are less willing to pay a higher price 
for catastrophe coverage from a higher-rated insurer but are more willing to do so for non-
catastrophe coverage. This may make some sense if consumers view an insurer’s ability to 
handle non-catastrophe losses as a more significant issue than its ability to handle catastrophe 
losses, which are less frequent and less severe in New York than in Florida. 
 
D. Guaranty Funds 
To conclude our analysis, we examine the effects of guaranty fund coverage of 
insolventinsurers’ claims on the demand for insurance. All states have insurance guaranty funds 
that pay insolvent insurers’ claims, but the limits of this coverage vary. In Florida, the limit for 
guaranty fund coverage is $300,000 per claim and in New York this limit is $1,000,000.
30 Thus, 
unpaid losses above those amounts are not covered by guaranty funds and claimants must 
attempt to recover these amounts as general creditors against the insurer’s estate.
31 This would 
suggest that consumers with Coverage A limits on their dwelling above these amounts should 
pay more attention to the financial solvency prospects of their insurers. 
We are able to test this hypothesis on the Florida data because there are ample observations 
of homes with Coverage A limits above $300,000. For the state of New York, our dataset had too 
few observations of Coverage A limits over $1,000,000 to test this hypothesis. 
Table 6 shows the results of our analysis, focusing on an insurer’s A.M. Best rating as the 
measure of its financial strength. These estimates are derived from models like those shown in 
                                                 
30  See http://www.ncigf.org/Publications/Claim%20Parameters.xls for a summary of state fund policy limits for 
2001. 
31 Coverages in addition to Coverage A triggered by a given claim would be combined with Coverage A losses in 
the application of the guaranty fund claim coverage limit. For example, if a fire totally destroyed an insured’s home 
with a Coverage A limit of $250,000 and personal property valued at $125,000, the Florida guaranty fund would 




Table 4, but estimated separately for homes where the Coverage A limit was above or below the 
Florida guaranty fund limit of $300,000 per claim. Panel A shows the results for homes below 
the $300,000 policy limit for total demand, catastrophe coverage, and non-catastrophe coverage. 
Once again, the rating level of A+ and above was omitted. Panel A’s results look similar to the 
overall result shown in Table 4. Generally, total demand is higher for lower rated firms. The 
same is true for non-catastrophe coverage. For catastrophe coverage, consumers have greater 
demand for A rated companies and the NR2 rated company over A+ and higher rated companies 
and insurers in the other rating category. This suggests that consumers that are fully protected by 
guaranty funds may be willing to pay more for insurers with good ratings but not the additional 
premium for insurers with a superior rating. As explained earlier, the insurer with the NR2 rating 
is an anomaly as it is a subsidiary of high-rated insurer. 
If a consumer is not fully covered in the event of his insurer’s insolvency, then we would 
expect that he would place a greater value on the insurer’s financial strength. Thus, all 
coefficients should be negative. This is generally what is observed in Panel B. For the total 
demand equation, all coefficients are negative (except for the anomalous NR2 company and that 
is not significantly different from zero). We also see a logical ordering of the coefficients on the 
various rating categories reflecting lexiographic preferences (A+ > A> A-> B+) based on the 
ratings. For the catastrophe demand and non-catastrophe demand equations, we see the same 
relationships. Thus, we find evidence that consumers do pay greater attention to financial 
strength when exposed to insolvency risk, as well as evidence of the (not so subtle) moral hazard 
created by guaranty funds for consumers who do not have this exposure.
32 
 
                                                 
32 We should also note that insurance agents exposed to lawsuits in the event of an insolvency may urge consumers 




IV. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Our analysis seeks to illuminate factors affecting homeowners insurance transactions in 
markets subject to different levels of catastrophe risk and regulatory pressure. We estimated the 
demand for homeowners’ insurance coverage in Florida and New York using two-stage least 
squares regression and data on insurance contracts, housing and demographic variables, and firm 
characteristics. Advisory indicated lost costs were used to measure the quantity of insurance 
purchased and the price mark-up or loading to measure price. The quantity of insurance was 
divided into two components: 1) expected catastrophe losses; and 2) expected non-catastrophe 
related losses. We used this formulation to separately estimate the demands for catastrophe 
coverage, non-catastrophe coverage, and the total or combined amount of coverage. 
Our models estimate the demand effects of standard variables, such as price and income, as 
well as variables more specific to homeowners insurance transactions under catastrophe risk, 
such as coverage options and an insured’s risk characteristics. We find that the demand for 
catastrophe coverage is more price elastic than the demand for non-catastrophe coverage. This 
was true in both Florida and New York. However, the Florida price elasticities were higher in 
absolute value than New York’s estimated price elasticities, suggesting that price elasticity 
increases with the cost or price of insurance. 
We also found that income elasticities differed between the two states. In Florida, the 
income elasticity of demand was positive and between .25 and .37. In New York, we found that 
the income elasticity was negative for total coverage and for non-catastrophe coverage, implying 
that these are inferior goods. For catastrophe coverage, the income elasticity in New York was 




We also found that regulatory rate suppression/compression increased the demand for 
insurance in both states. However, the effect of regulatory price constraints was greater in 
Florida where a given percentage rate inadequacy (e.g., 10 percent) results in a higher absolute 
subsidy to the insured. 
Generally, options that expand coverage tend to increase demand, suggesting that consumers 
are willing to pay the incremental cost of additional coverage. Interestingly, higher deductibles 
also are associated with higher demand. Our explanation is that consumers tend to follow 
experts’ advice to increase their deductibles and use the premium savings to purchase additional 
coverage that offers a better value in terms of protection against risk. 
Finally, we found some evidence that a consumer’s exposure to an insurer’s insolvency risk 
(as measured by the amount of a potential total loss that would not be covered by the guaranty 
fund) affects his valuation of financial strength. Using A.M. Best ratings as a measure of a firm’s 
solvency prospects, we found evidence that consumers with contractual limits below the state 
guarantee fund policy limit prefer a lower price than higher financial strength. In contrast, 
consumers with contractual limits above the guaranty fund coverage limit appear to place greater 
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Variables in Demand Study 
 
 





Comments and Codings 
COMPNO  Company Number (1-83)  Link to Company Data 
YEAR  Year (1995-1998)  0 (1995), 1 (1996), 2 (1997, 3 (1998) 
ZIP  Zip Code  Zip code 
STATE  State  Separate Panels for FL & NY 
TERRIT  Territory  Location Identifier for Cat-Losses 
POLICY Policy  Form 
HO1 (NY only), HO3, HO5, HO8 
Dummy Variables to Reflect Policy Form 
Coverages 
SUBLINE  Subline  Reflects Loss Settlement Basis( Dummy 
variable :1 if Replacement Cost Coverage) 
EXCIND  Exception Indicator  Dummy Variable: 1 = Wind Transferred to Pool 
STEXCIND 
or STEX 




Ordinance or Law Coverage  Dummy Variable: 1 = Coverage Pays Additional 
Cost Required To Repair a Damaged Home 
According To Current Building Codes 
FAM  Number of Families  Dummy Variable: 1 = Multiple Families 




Dummy Variables to Reflect 
Different types of Structures 
YEARCON  Year of Construction  Dummy Variable: 1 = Constructed after 1960 
WIND_DS  Wind Deductible Size ($’s)  Wind Deductible Converted to $’s if Expressed 
as Percentage of COVA 
FIRE_DS  Fire Deductible Size ($’s)  Fire Deductible Converted to $’s if Expressed as 
Percentage of COVA 
PROTCD  Protection Code  Ordinal Ranking Variable for the Structure (1-
10), the Lower the Better 
BCEG  Building Code Effectiveness Grading  Community Grading 
COVA  Coverage A Limit  Dollar Amount of Coverage A Limit 
 
COVCPCT  Coverage C as Percent of COVA  In Standard Policy, COVCPCT = 50% 
COVELIM  Coverage E (Liability) Limit  Converted to $’s if expressed as Percentage of 
COVA 
ILC  Total ISO Indicated Loss Costs  Dollar Amount 
ILC_C  ISO Indicated Loss Costs Cat Portion  Dollar Amount 
ILC_NC  ISO Indicated Loss Costs NonCat Portion  Dollar Amount 
PREMS  Annualized Premium Limit  Dollar Amount 
PRICE Annualized  Price   
(1+r)(PREMS-ILC]/[ILC] 




Table A2: Company Data 
From the NAIC Annual Statement, Supplemented by Data from the A.M. Best Key 







Comments and Codings 
MKT_CODE  Marketing System Employed by the Firm 
Agent = 1 if an “agency writer” 
Direct =1 if a “direct writer” 
Dummy Variables to Represent Various 
Forms of Marketing and Distribution 
Systems 
Company ID  Various Identifiers for the Company and the Group in 
Which it Operates 
Link to A.M. Best Data 
CAPSURP  Capital and Surplus  Total Firm C&S 
BCAR  Best Capital Adequacy Ratio  This is a risk-based capital measure 
FSC  Best Financial Size Category  Discrete size categories based on Adjusted 
Policy Holder Surplus 
STRENGTH  Best Strength Category  Numeric coding from 1 to 9 Reflecting 
A.M. Best Rating, where 1 is the best 
(A++) 
RATING  AM Best Rating  Alpha Numeric Coding of Best Rating 
TOTASS  Total Assets  In $ 
LTOTASS  Log of Total Assets  In Log $ 
SOBnRAT  State Line of Business Concentration  The % of Total Firm Business in top “n” 
States in which it does business, a 
geographic concentration indicator 
HOME1  Homeowners is First Line of Business  Dummy Variable if HO is the highest % of 
Direct Premiums Written (DPW) to Total 
DPW for the Firm 
HOME2  Homeowners is Second Line of Business  Defined as in HOME1 
LOBnRAT  n-Line of Business Concentration Ratio  Percent of writings in the top “n” Lines of 
Business divided by DPW 
FLAUTO/ NYAUTO  Total of Personal Auto Lines Premiums in each State  An Indicator of Cross-Marketing potential 
for the Firm 
FLHOTOT/ 
NYHOTO 
Percent of Business in State (FL & NY)  Ratio of Homeowners to Total DPW in the 
respective State 











Comments and Codings 
FLLPREM/ 
NYLPREM 
Total Life Insurance Premiums written by Companies 
in Same Group as the Firm 
An Indicator of Cross Marketing potential 
for the Firm 
HOMEDPW  Sum of HO Premiums in the State 
 
 
LHOMEDPW  Log of HOMEDPW 
 
 
TOTDPW  Total of Direct Premiums Written Nationwide   








Dummy Variables to reflect 
Organizational Form  
Mutual =1 if a mutual 
Stock= 1 if a stock 
HO_EX  Homeowners Line Expenses  Direct Loss Adjustment Expenses Incurred 
+ Brokerage Fees and Taxes, Licenses & 
Fees for HO Line 
HO_EX_RT  Expense Ratio for Homeowners Line  Ratio of HO_EX to Homeowners DPW in 
the State 
IEE_EX  Unallocated Homeowners Line Expenses  Amount of total Homeowners expense that 
remains unallocated after allocations to all 
States.  
C_OUT  Total Number of Claims Outstanding for the year in 
question and the previous two years 
 
C_REPT  Total Number of Claims Reported during the year in 
question and the two previous years 
 
C_RAT  Ratio of total number of claims outstanding to the 
number of claims (Reported and Outstanding) 
A Quality of Service Measure 
TOT_PD  Total Paid Claims From Past Three Years, in the year 
in question and the previous two years 
 
TOT_UNPD  Total Unpaid Claims from Past Three Years, the year 
in question and the previous two years 
 
TOT_RAT  Ratio of Unpaid Claims to Total Claims, i.e. the ratio 
of TOT_PD to TOT_UNPD 




Table A3: Socio-Demographic Data Used in the Demand Analysis 
All data taken at the ZIP-Code level from the 1990 Census Data 
 
 
Median Householder Income In The Zip Code 
% Of Housing Units That Have A Mortgage 
% Of Housing Units In Which Mortgage Is Greater Than 30% Of Household Exps 
Average Age Of Householder 
% Of Housing Units Occupied By Owner 
% Of Income That Constitutes Retired Income 
Percentage Of People Above 25 Who Have Completed 12Th Grade 
Percentage Of People Above 25 Who Have A College Degree 
Median Year Structures Were Built In The Zip 
Median Value Of Structures In The Zip 
% Of Population That Is In The Urban Areas In The Zip 
% Of Population That Is In The Rural Areas In The Zip 
Number Of People Above The Age Of 16 
Number Of People Above The Age Of 25 
% Of Married Couples With Children In The Population 
 
 
 Contract Terms …
HO1 (sold in few 
states like NY) HO2
HO3      
Typical
HO5  Most 












(all perils) (all perils)
Home x x x x x
Other Attached Property and Structures x x x x x
Personal Property Not Covered Not Covered x x x
Loss of Use x x x x x
Personal Liability to Others x x x x x
Medical Payments to Others x x x x x




























Source:  Authors' analysis of Standard ISO Contracts for Florida and New York
Table 1
Comparison of Florida Homeowners Contracts Basic Terms
Insurance Covers …
Policy FormFlorida
HO2 HO3 HO5 HO8
No of Contracts 4,381               977,850               71,659               210               
Percent of Contracts 0.42% 92.77% 6.80% 0.02%
Premium 443.81 $          704.17 $              1,038.85 $         490.53 $       
Price 1.452 1.2682 1.0255 1.777
New York
HO1 HO2 HO3 HO5
No of Contracts 8,847               473,487               1,675,717          172,897        
Percent of Contracts 0.38% 20.31% 71.89% 7.42%
Premium . 492.84 $              639.59 $            869.01 $       
Price . 2.047 1.634 1.308
Table 2
Mean Prices and Premium Level for Various Policy Forms in 
New York and FloridaVariables Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max
Insured Risk Characteristics
% Of Homes With Frame Construction 0.305 0.337 0.000 1.000
% Of Homes With Brick Construction 0.690 0.338 0.000 1.000
Protection Code (1 Is Highest) 4.927 1.731 1.000 10.000
Contract Terms
Total Indicated Loss Costs 884.51 $               1102.030 121.93 $                   26,567.09 $            
Catastrophe Related Modeled Indicated Loss Costs 509.73 $               859.337 - $                         21,962.30 $            
Non-Catastrophe Indicated Loss Costs 374.78 $               290.342 87.63 $                     5,548.80 $              
Log Of (Price +1) 0.148 0.485 -3.515 1.591
Price + 1 1.292 0.575 0.030 4.911
% Of Ho3 Policies In Zip Code 0.889 0.261 0.000 1.000
% Of Ho5 Polices In Zip Code 0.117 0.266 0.000 1.000
% Of Ho8 Policies In Zip Code 0.000 0.016 0.000 1.000
% Of Policies With Wind Exclusion (Fl Only) 0.016 0.106 0.000 1.000
% Of Policies With Replacement Cost Coverage 0.910 0.199 0.000 1.000
% Of Policies With Ord Or Law Coverage 0.525 0.463 0.000 1.000
Coverage A Limit 140,527 $            91715.950 12,000 $                   1,009,091 $            
Wind Deductible 741.54 $               1449.74 100.00 $                   9,994.70 $              
Fire Deductible 379.80 $               158.976 100.00 $                   1,200.00 $              
% Of Total Indicated Lost Costs That Are Due To Cat Costs 0.424 0.228 0.000 0.911
% With Wind Protection Device Credit (Fl) 0.062 0.206 0.000 1.000
Neighborhood Characteristics
% Of Implemented Loss Costs To Indicated Loss Costs 0.690 0.065 0.478 0.920
Median Year Of Construction In Zip 1974.320 8.008 1943.000 1988.000
% Of Homes In Zip Code With A Mortgage 0.871 0.082 0.000 1.000
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Income 0.026 0.006 0.000 0.083
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Home Value 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.024
Log Of Average Age Of Pop In Zip Code 3.642 0.165 3.065 4.275
% Of Households In Urban Areas  0.999 0.000 0.999 0.999
% Of Persons In Zip Aged 65 Or Over 0.178 0.112 0.000 0.824
Median Income 29,629.40 $         9,650.77 $                7,890.00 $                78,668.00 $            
Firm Characteristics
Direct Writer 0.157 0.364 0.000 1.000
Stock Company 0.893 0.309 0.000 1.000
Auto Premiums Written By Company 29,032,243 $       47,672,173.11          2 $                             181,509,056 $        
Life Premiums Written By Sister Company 30,078,038 $       56,541,229.77          0 $                             182,655,744 $        
Total Assets Of Company Selling Policy 3,125,676,695 $  4,307,150,626.00     34,816,452 $            21,168,613,920 $   
Am Best Rating Of A+ Or Higher 0.575 0.494 0.000 1.000
Am Best Rating Of A 0.250 0.433 0.000 1.000
Am Best Rating Of A-  0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000
Am Best Rating Of B+ 0.011 0.106 0.000 1.000
Am Best Rating Of Nr2 0.007 0.085 0.000 1.000
Time Indicators
1995 Indicator
1996 Indicator 0.251 0.434 0.000 1.000
1997 Indicator 0.257 0.437 0.000 1.000
1998 Indicator 0.266 0.442 0.000 1.000
N = 43,267
Florida Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 Panel A.Variables Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max
Insured Risk Characteristics
% Of Homes With Frame Construction 0.887 0.229 0.000 1.000
% Of Homes With Brick Construction 0.112 0.228 0.000 1.000
Protection Code (1 Is Highest) 6.437 2.370 1.000 10.000
Contract Terms
Total Indicated Loss Costs 448.43 $                  262.123 102.82 $           4,309.08 $             
Catastrophe Related Modeled Indicated Loss Costs 41.33 $                    102.178 0.14 $               1,909.33 $             
Non-Catastrophe Indicated Loss Costs 407.10 $                  227.753 89.53 $             4,242.24 $             
"Price + 1" 1.725 0.549 0.137 4.974
% Of Ho1 Policies In Zip Code (Ny Only) 0.004 0.032 0.000 0.833
% Of Ho2 Policies In Zip Code (Ny Only) 0.178 0.271 0.000 1.000
% Of Ho3 Policies In Zip Code 0.736 0.316 0.000 1.000
% Of Ho5 Polices In Zip Code 0.082 0.213 0.000 1.000
% Of Ho8 Policies In Zip Code 0.000 0.004 0.000 1.000
% Of Policies With Replacement Cost Coverage 0.672 0.335 0.000 1.000
% Of Policies With Ord Or Law Coverage 0.352 0.444 0.000 1.000
Coverage A Limit 183.562 104.966 5.000 1009.090
Wind Deductible 5.738 0.517 4.605 9.209
Fire Deductible 342.208 162.506 50.000 1200.000
% Of Total Indicated Lost Costs That Are Due To Cat Costs 0.008 0.704 -1.000 1.000
Off Premises Theft Coverage 0.028 0.120 0.000 1.000
Neighborhood Characteristics
% Of Implemented Loss Costs To Indicated Loss Costs 0.919 0.109 0.000 1.107
Median Year Of Construction In Zip 1955.720 10.615 1939.000 1988.000
% Of Homes In Zip Code With A Mortgage 0.796 0.114 0.000 1.000
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Income 0.025 0.008 0.000 0.140
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Home Value 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.037
% Of Households In Urban Areas  0.552 0.497 0.000 1.000
% Of Persons In Zip Aged 65 Or Over 0.135 0.050 0.000 0.677
Median Income 40,004.39 $             16663.760 4,999.00 $        150,001.00 $         
Firm Characteristics
Direct Writer 0.134 0.341 0.000 1.000
Stock Company 0.902 0.297 0.000 1.000
Auto Premiums Written By Company 44,084,866 $           40809184 526 $                152,694,176 $       
Life Premiums Written By Sister Company 193,270,586 $         289152435 3,436 $             904,290,112 $       
Total Assets Of Company Selling Policy 3,120,947,934 $      3750565022 19,213,992 $    20,535,422,976 $  
Am Best Rating Of A+ Or Higher 0.466 0.499 0.000 1.000
Am Best Rating Of A 0.392 0.488 0.000 1.000
Am Best Rating Of A-  0.142 0.349 0.000 1.000
Time Indicators
1995 Indicator 0.216 0.412 0.000 1.000
1996 Indicator 0.260 0.439 0.000 1.000
1997 Indicator 0.253 0.435 0.000 1.000
1998 Indicator 0.271 0.445 0.000 1.000
N = 68,738
New York Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 Panel BVariables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob
Intercept ? 27.387 0.846 32.350 0.000 17.916 1.868 9.590 0.000 26.292 0.842 31.240 0.000
Selection Variable ? 0.010 0.023 0.430 0.667 -0.216 0.050 -4.290 0.000 0.031 0.023 1.390 0.165
Insured Risk Characteristics
% Of Homes With Frame Construction + 0.139 0.045 3.110 0.002 0.130 0.099 1.320 0.187 0.299 0.044 6.720 0.000
% Of Homes With Brick Construction +/- 0.037 0.045 0.820 0.412 0.227 0.099 2.300 0.021 0.174 0.045 3.920 0.000
Protection Code (1 Is Highest) +/- 0.040 0.002 21.380 0.000 0.030 0.004 7.200 0.000 0.033 0.002 17.880 0.000
Contract Terms
Log Of (Price +1) x - -1.411 0.009 -150.280 0.000 -2.873 0.021 -138.720 0.000 -0.407 0.009 -43.640 0.000
% Of Ho3 Policies In Zip Code - -0.250 0.013 -18.880 0.000 -0.138 0.029 -4.740 0.000 -0.276 0.013 -21.020 0.000
% Of Ho8 Policies In Zip Code - 0.354 0.149 2.380 0.017 -1.643 0.329 -5.000 0.000 0.830 0.148 5.610 0.000
% Of Policies With Wind Exclusion (Fl Only) - 0.729 0.041 17.640 0.000 1.387 0.091 15.210 0.000 0.379 0.041 9.230 0.000
% Of Policies With Replacement Cost Coverage + -0.038 0.013 -2.780 0.005 -0.061 0.030 -2.040 0.041 0.066 0.013 4.950 0.000
% Of Policies With Ord Or Law Coverage +/- 0.474 0.026 17.930 0.000 0.513 0.058 8.790 0.000 0.199 0.026 7.560 0.000
Log Of Coverage A Limit + 0.487 0.032 15.360 0.000 -0.655 0.070 -9.360 0.000 0.856 0.032 27.130 0.000
Log Of Wind Deductible x +/- -0.236 0.025 -9.340 0.000 0.346 0.056 6.210 0.000 -0.442 0.025 -17.570 0.000
Log Of Fire Deductible x +/- 0.303 0.038 8.020 0.000 1.270 0.083 15.240 0.000 -0.192 0.038 -5.120 0.000
% With Wind Protection Device Credit (Fl) x ? 1.451 0.081 17.960 0.000 1.324 0.178 7.420 0.000 0.622 0.080 7.740 0.000
Neighborhood Characteristics
% Of Implemented Loss Costs To Indicated Loss Costs - -0.429 0.036 -11.830 0.000 -0.396 0.080 -4.950 0.000 -0.490 0.036 -13.570 0.000
Median Year Of Construction In Zip - -0.013 0.000 -32.680 0.000 -0.013 0.001 -15.100 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -27.740 0.000
% Of Homes In Zip Code With A Mortgage +/- -0.336 0.050 -6.780 0.000 0.265 0.109 2.420 0.016 -0.209 0.049 -4.240 0.000
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Income ? 11.701 0.821 14.250 0.000 14.447 1.812 7.970 0.000 8.408 0.817 10.290 0.000
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Home Value ? 3.927 2.228 1.760 0.078 -35.053 4.917 -7.130 0.000 16.895 2.216 7.630 0.000
Log Of Average Age Of Pop In Zip Code ? -0.163 0.057 -2.870 0.004 0.696 0.125 5.560 0.000 -0.498 0.056 -8.840 0.000
% Of Households In Urban Areas  +/- -0.026 0.009 -2.810 0.005 0.051 0.021 2.450 0.014 -0.071 0.009 -7.550 0.000
% Of Persons In Zip Aged 65 Or Over + -0.262 0.083 -3.180 0.001 -1.086 0.182 -5.960 0.000 0.256 0.082 3.110 0.002
Log Of Median Income +/- 0.293 0.026 11.160 0.000 0.368 0.058 6.350 0.000 0.259 0.026 9.890 0.000
Firm Characteristics
Direct Writer ? 0.189 0.023 8.040 0.000 0.151 0.052 2.910 0.004 0.130 0.023 5.550 0.000
Stock Company ? 0.149 0.014 10.470 0.000 0.176 0.031 5.590 0.000 0.075 0.014 5.260 0.000
Log Of Auto Premiums Written By Company ? -0.033 0.001 -33.180 0.000 -0.035 0.002 -15.660 0.000 -0.034 0.001 -34.320 0.000
Log Of Life Premiums Written By Associated Company ? 0.303 0.038 8.020 0.000 1.270 0.083 15.240 0.000 -0.192 0.038 -5.120 0.000
Log Of Total Assets Of Firm Selling Policy  ? -0.024 0.004 -5.820 0.000 0.013 0.009 1.430 0.153 -0.017 0.004 -4.170 0.000
Am Best Rating Of A ? -0.118 0.018 -6.580 0.000 0.421 0.040 10.620 0.000 -0.260 0.018 -14.560 0.000
Am Best Rating Of A-  ? -0.392 0.024 -16.290 0.000 -0.202 0.053 -3.800 0.000 -0.232 0.024 -9.700 0.000
Am Best Rating Of B+ ? 0.051 0.026 1.970 0.049 -0.249 0.057 -4.370 0.000 0.191 0.026 7.440 0.000
Am Best Rating Of Nr2 ? 0.222 0.035 6.300 0.000 0.237 0.078 3.050 0.002 0.210 0.035 5.990 0.000
Time Indicators
1996 Indicator + 0.012 0.017 0.710 0.478 -0.134 0.037 -3.600 0.000 0.164 0.017 9.810 0.000
1997 Indicator + -0.105 0.036 -2.960 0.003 -0.259 0.079 -3.290 0.001 0.201 0.035 5.690 0.000
1998 Indicator + -0.137 0.041 -3.380 0.001 -0.135 0.090 -1.510 0.131 0.134 0.040 3.320 0.001








Total Indicated Lost Costs Catastrophic Indicated Loss Costs Non-Catastrophic Indicated Loss Costs
Two Stage Least Squares Results
Florida Contract Demand Equations For Total Loss Costs, Catastrophic Loss Costs,and Non-Catastrophic Loss CostsVariables
Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob
Intercept ? 6.097 0.799 7.630 0.000 30.029 1.064 28.230 0.000 24.611 2.674 9.210 0.000
Selection Variable ? -0.058 0.015 -3.910 0.000 -0.019 0.029 -0.650 0.516 0.184 0.078 2.370 0.018
Insured Risk Characteristics
% Of Homes With Frame Construction + 0.202 0.066 3.070 0.002 0.165 0.062 2.650 0.008 -0.014 0.101 -0.140 0.889
% Of Homes With Brick Construction +/- 0.009 0.066 0.130 0.897 0.078 0.063 1.250 0.211 -0.026 0.099 -0.270 0.787
Protection Code (1 Is Highest) +/- 0.049 0.002 31.000 0.000 0.039 0.002 16.550 0.000 0.020 0.006 3.070 0.002
Contract Terms
Log Of (Price +1) x - -0.669 0.016 -41.450 0.000 -1.478 0.014 -103.190 0.000 -1.280 0.068 -18.900 0.000
% Of Ho3 Policies In Zip Code - -0.184 0.011 -17.190 0.000 -0.201 0.016 -12.530 0.000 -0.407 0.044 -9.320 0.000
% Of Ho8 Policies In Zip Code - 0.526 0.092 5.730 0.000 -0.032 0.237 -0.140 0.889 0.869 1.081 0.800 0.424
% Of Policies With Wind Exclusion (Fl Only) - -0.068 0.028 -2.470 0.014 0.766 0.048 15.950 0.000 2.450 0.262 9.350 0.000
% Of Policies With Replacement Cost Coverage + 0.032 0.011 2.990 0.003 -0.023 0.018 -1.270 0.204 0.011 0.039 0.290 0.772
% Of Policies With Ord Or Law Coverage +/- 0.252 0.020 12.560 0.000 0.326 0.032 10.040 0.000 0.823 0.069 11.880 0.000
Log Of Coverage A Limit + 0.662 0.024 27.950 0.000 0.277 0.039 7.100 0.000 0.760 0.084 9.000 0.000
Log Of Wind Deductible x +/- -0.060 0.016 -3.690 0.000 0.014 0.031 0.460 0.646 -0.549 0.098 -5.580 0.000
Log Of Fire Deductible x +/- 0.160 0.030 5.290 0.000 0.323 0.043 7.550 0.000 0.251 0.111 2.250 0.024
% With Wind Protection Device Credit (Fl) x ? 0.384 0.054 7.040 0.000 0.891 0.106 8.440 0.000 3.501 0.267 13.120 0.000
Neighborhood Characteristics
% Of Implemented Loss Costs To Indicated Loss Costs x - 0.123 0.034 3.680 0.000 -0.579 0.044 -13.130 0.000 -0.308 0.117 -2.640 0.008
Median Year Of Construction In Zip - -0.002 0.000 -6.420 0.000 -0.014 0.000 -30.030 0.000 -0.009 0.001 -7.570 0.000
% Of Homes In Zip Code With A Mortgage +/- -0.112 0.039 -2.830 0.005 -0.106 0.064 -1.650 0.099 0.154 0.180 0.850 0.395
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Income - -0.339 0.759 -0.450 0.653 18.914 1.213 15.590 0.000 7.230 1.774 4.080 0.000
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Home Value - -2.887 1.654 -1.740 0.082 -27.541 3.141 -8.770 0.000 6.167 7.805 0.790 0.430
Log Of Average Age Of Pop In Zip Code - 0.458 0.058 7.840 0.000 -0.234 0.070 -3.320 0.001 -0.313 0.172 -1.820 0.069
% Of Households In Urban Areas  - 0.075 0.009 8.380 0.000 -0.038 0.012 -3.270 0.001 0.067 0.031 2.170 0.030
% Of Persons In Zip Aged 65 Or Over ? -0.858 0.095 -9.060 0.000 -0.243 0.105 -2.330 0.020 0.001 0.231 0.010 0.992
Log Of Median Income +/- -0.018 0.023 -0.760 0.447 0.274 0.029 9.300 0.000 0.163 0.069 2.350 0.019
Firm Characteristics
Direct Writer ? -0.035 0.018 -1.930 0.054 0.231 0.028 8.250 0.000 0.310 0.074 4.180 0.000
Stock Company ? 0.010 0.013 0.730 0.465 0.157 0.017 9.090 0.000 0.201 0.045 4.470 0.000
Log Of Auto Premiums Written By Company ? -0.026 0.001 -25.860 0.000 -0.028 0.001 -23.290 0.000 -0.039 0.003 -13.780 0.000
Log Of Life Premiums Written By Associated Company ? 0.160 0.030 5.290 0.000 0.323 0.043 7.550 0.000 0.251 0.111 2.250 0.024
Log Of Total Assets Of Firm Selling Policy  - -0.011 0.003 -3.690 0.000 -0.003 0.006 -0.470 0.638 -0.061 0.013 -4.640 0.000
Am Best Rating Of A ? -0.046 0.011 -4.000 0.000 0.080 0.027 2.980 0.003 -0.266 0.044 -6.080 0.000
Am Best Rating Of A-  ? -0.119 0.015 -7.720 0.000 -0.144 0.033 -4.350 0.000 -0.721 0.062 -11.650 0.000
Am Best Rating Of B+ ? -0.023 0.022 -1.080 0.280 0.093 0.030 3.140 0.002 0.191 0.078 2.460 0.014
Am Best Rating Of Nr2 ? 0.028 0.030 0.930 0.352 0.269 0.040 6.740 0.000 0.290 0.116 2.490 0.013
Time Indicators
1996 Indicator + -0.018 0.013 -1.440 0.150 0.008 0.019 0.430 0.667 -0.134 0.051 -2.640 0.008
1997 Indicator + 0.005 0.028 0.190 0.849 0.004 0.040 0.110 0.912 -0.452 0.106 -4.270 0.000
1998 Indicator + -0.022 0.031 -0.710 0.478 0.037 0.047 0.780 0.435 -0.655 0.117 -5.590 0.000




Two Stage Least Squares Results
Lowest 25% ILC-Cat/Indicated Lost Costs Middle 50% ILC-Cat/Indicated Lost Costs Highest 25% ILC-Cat/Indicated Lost Costs
Florida Contract Demand Equations Classified by Ratio of Catastrophic Loss Costs to Total Loss Costs
Hypothesized 
sign Endogenous Variable
Table 4a Fla Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob
Intercept ? 3.272 0.178 18.410 0.000 -15.206 0.646 -23.540 0.000 4.172 0.289 14.450 0.000
Selection Variable ? 0.000 0.015 0.000 1.000 -0.201 0.055 -3.660 0.000 0.084 0.025 3.410 0.001
Insured Risk Characteristics
% Of Homes With Frame Construction + 0.055 0.024 2.330 0.020 0.496 0.086 5.760 0.000 -0.013 0.038 -0.340 0.734
% Of Homes With Brick Construction +/- -0.068 0.024 -2.840 0.005 -0.099 0.087 -1.130 0.258 -0.130 0.039 -3.350 0.001
Protection Code (1 Is Highest) +/- 0.054 0.001 96.100 0.000 0.006 0.002 2.860 0.004 0.054 0.001 58.740 0.000
Contract Terms
Log Of (Price +1) x - -0.224 0.017 -13.500 0.000 -0.419 0.060 -6.960 0.000 -0.058 0.027 -2.160 0.031
% Of Ho1 Policies In Zip Code (Ny Only) - -0.128 0.028 -4.590 0.000 -0.126 0.102 -1.240 0.215 -0.068 0.045 -1.510 0.131
% Of Ho2 Policies In Zip Code (Ny Only) - -0.436 0.014 -32.260 0.000 -0.067 0.049 -1.370 0.171 -0.444 0.022 -20.190 0.000
% Of Ho3 Policies In Zip Code - -0.244 0.008 -28.830 0.000 -0.092 0.031 -2.980 0.003 -0.229 0.014 -16.620 0.000
% Of Policies With Replacement Cost Coverage + 0.135 0.004 31.290 0.000 0.212 0.016 13.540 0.000 0.117 0.007 16.650 0.000
% Of Policies With Ord Or Law Coverage +/- 0.035 0.007 4.980 0.000 -0.079 0.026 -3.080 0.002 0.101 0.011 8.840 0.000
Log Of Coverage A Limit x + 1.019 0.017 59.240 0.000 1.134 0.063 18.130 0.000 0.929 0.028 33.220 0.000
Log Of Wind Deductible x +/- 0.168 0.044 3.810 0.000 -0.481 0.160 -3.010 0.003 0.559 0.072 7.810 0.000
Log Of Fire Deductible x +/- -0.464 0.024 -19.580 0.000 -0.380 0.086 -4.420 0.000 -0.552 0.038 -14.350 0.000
% Off Premises Coverage Exclusion (Ny) + 0.093 0.012 7.540 0.000 -0.061 0.045 -1.360 0.174 0.181 0.020 9.050 0.000
Neighborhood Characteristics
% Of Implemented Loss Costs To Indicated Loss Costs - -0.002 0.009 -0.260 0.795 -0.093 0.031 -2.990 0.003 -0.038 0.014 -2.730 0.006
Median Year Of Construction In Zip - 0.000 0.000 -1.280 0.201 0.006 0.000 19.730 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -4.320 0.000
% Of Homes In Zip Code With A Mortgage +/- 0.003 0.010 0.280 0.779 0.225 0.037 6.070 0.000 0.017 0.017 1.030 0.303
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Income ? 0.292 0.260 1.120 0.263 -4.489 0.947 -4.740 0.000 -2.187 0.423 -5.170 0.000
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Home Value ? -0.984 0.790 -1.250 0.211 17.306 2.871 6.030 0.000 5.724 1.283 4.460 0.000
Log Of Average Age Of Pop In Zip Code ? 0.028 0.017 1.650 0.099 -0.294 0.061 -4.780 0.000 -0.037 0.027 -1.340 0.180
% Of Households In Urban Areas  +/- -0.017 0.003 -5.050 0.000 -0.308 0.012 -25.630 0.000 0.044 0.005 8.160 0.000
% Of Persons In Zip Aged 65 Or Over + 0.245 0.032 7.610 0.000 3.260 0.117 27.870 0.000 -0.011 0.052 -0.210 0.834
Log Of Median Income +/- -0.079 0.008 -9.700 0.000 0.307 0.030 10.330 0.000 -0.093 0.013 -7.040 0.000
Firm Characteristics
Direct Writer ? 0.003 0.010 0.300 0.764 0.010 0.037 0.280 0.779 -0.025 0.017 -1.530 0.126
Stock Company ? -0.017 0.007 -2.350 0.019 0.080 0.026 3.090 0.002 -0.062 0.012 -5.330 0.000
Log Of Auto Premiums Written By Company ? -0.018 0.000 -39.780 0.000 -0.023 0.002 -14.010 0.000 -0.017 0.001 -23.900 0.000
Log Of Life Premiums Written By Associated Company ? -0.009 0.000 -22.560 0.000 -0.010 0.001 -7.060 0.000 -0.008 0.001 -13.780 0.000
Log Of Total Assets Of Firm Selling Policy  ? 0.016 0.004 3.950 0.000 0.083 0.015 5.660 0.000 -0.018 0.007 -2.790 0.005
Am Best Rating Of A ? 0.009 0.006 1.580 0.114 0.101 0.021 4.780 0.000 -0.045 0.009 -4.780 0.000
Am Best Rating Of A-  ? -0.004 0.005 -0.830 0.407 0.039 0.018 2.130 0.033 -0.039 0.008 -4.740 0.000
Time Indicators
1996 Indicator + -0.002 0.003 -0.640 0.522 0.031 0.011 2.750 0.006 -0.023 0.005 -4.720 0.000
1997 Indicator + 0.014 0.003 4.200 0.000 0.059 0.012 4.750 0.000 -0.015 0.006 -2.620 0.009
1998 Indicator + 0.035 0.005 7.140 0.000 0.104 0.018 5.780 0.000 -0.009 0.008 -1.160 0.246








Total Indicated Lost Costs Catastrophic Indicated Loss Costs Non-Catastrophic Indicated Loss Costs
Two Stage Least Squares Results
New York Contract Demand Equations For Total Loss Costs, Catastrophic Loss Costs,and Non-Catastrophic Loss Costs
 Variables
Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob Coefficient Std. Error t-stat Prob
Intercept ? 3.815 0.509 7.500 0.000 3.393 0.231 14.690 0.000 3.194 1.511 2.110 0.035
Selection Variable ? -0.021 0.028 -0.750 0.453 0.102 0.013 7.630 0.000 -0.353 0.063 -5.600 0.000
Insured Risk Characteristics
% Of Homes With Frame Construction + 0.071 0.049 1.460 0.144 -0.026 0.048 -0.550 0.582 0.772 0.185 4.180 0.000
% Of Homes With Brick Construction +/- -0.098 0.049 -2.030 0.042 -0.107 0.048 -2.240 0.025 0.797 0.189 4.210 0.000
Protection Code (1 Is Highest) +/- 0.051 0.001 39.580 0.000 0.047 0.001 78.300 0.000 0.010 0.003 3.500 0.000
Contract Terms
Log Of (Price +1) x - 0.000 0.031 0.010 0.992 -0.610 0.013 -47.320 0.000 -1.150 0.055 -21.060 0.000
% Of Ho1 Policies In Zip Code (Ny Only) - -0.087 0.058 -1.490 0.136 0.159 0.030 5.360 0.000 -0.392 0.196 -2.000 0.046
% Of Ho2 Policies In Zip Code (Ny Only) - -0.429 0.021 -20.250 0.000 -0.164 0.011 -15.170 0.000 -0.254 0.054 -4.720 0.000
% Of Ho3 Policies In Zip Code - -0.224 0.011 -19.840 0.000 -0.133 0.006 -20.570 0.000 -0.233 0.031 -7.570 0.000
% Of Policies With Replacement Cost Coverage + 0.075 0.009 8.620 0.000 0.047 0.004 11.180 0.000 0.106 0.018 6.010 0.000
% Of Policies With Ord Or Law Coverage +/- 0.083 0.008 10.090 0.000 -0.028 0.004 -7.210 0.000 -0.169 0.029 -5.760 0.000
Log Of Coverage A Limit x + 0.863 0.036 23.970 0.000 1.149 0.018 65.120 0.000 1.276 0.097 13.150 0.000
Log Of Wind Deductible x +/- 0.514 0.035 14.820 0.000 0.072 0.030 2.370 0.018 -0.589 0.066 -8.980 0.000
Log Of Fire Deductible x +/- -0.328 0.042 -7.810 0.000 -0.252 0.027 -9.190 0.000 -0.513 0.117 -4.370 0.000
% Off Premises Coverage Exclusion (Ny) + 0.141 0.024 5.890 0.000 0.058 0.013 4.430 0.000 0.094 0.033 2.800 0.005
Neighborhood Characteristics
% Of Implemented Loss Costs To Indicated Loss Costs - -0.140 0.013 -10.690 0.000 -0.073 0.012 -6.270 0.000 -0.259 0.054 -4.790 0.000
Median Year Of Construction In Zip - -0.001 0.000 -3.560 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.130 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -1.300 0.194
% Of Homes In Zip Code With A Mortgage +/- -0.044 0.024 -1.820 0.069 -0.017 0.014 -1.250 0.211 -0.075 0.100 -0.750 0.453
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Income ? -2.328 0.415 -5.600 0.000 1.100 0.335 3.290 0.001 5.993 2.546 2.350 0.019
Leverage Ratio Of Median Mortgage Costs To Median Home Value ? 9.732 1.335 7.290 0.000 -6.678 0.933 -7.150 0.000 -24.711 10.931 -2.260 0.024
Log Of Average Age Of Pop In Zip Code ? -0.086 0.048 -1.790 0.073 -0.006 0.021 -0.300 0.764 -0.008 0.152 -0.050 0.960
% Of Households In Urban Areas  +/- -0.016 0.009 -1.790 0.073 0.047 0.004 13.250 0.000 -0.014 0.022 -0.630 0.529
% Of Persons In Zip Aged 65 Or Over + 0.012 0.096 0.130 0.897 -0.035 0.042 -0.840 0.401 0.030 0.254 0.120 0.904
Log Of Median Income +/- -0.083 0.016 -5.140 0.000 -0.111 0.009 -12.250 0.000 0.151 0.058 2.630 0.009
Firm Characteristics
Direct Writer ? -0.108 0.032 -3.340 0.001 0.171 0.014 12.320 0.000 -0.145 0.051 -2.820 0.005
Stock Company ? -0.036 0.015 -2.390 0.017 0.011 0.007 1.560 0.119 0.092 0.035 2.660 0.008
Log Of Auto Premiums Written By Company ? -0.013 0.002 -8.740 0.000 -0.013 0.001 -20.310 0.000 -0.030 0.002 -12.650 0.000
Log Of Life Premiums Written By Associated Company ? -0.006 0.001 -4.600 0.000 -0.004 0.001 -8.150 0.000 -0.017 0.002 -7.840 0.000
Log Of Total Assets Of Firm Selling Policy  ? -0.007 0.005 -1.560 0.119 0.006 0.002 2.550 0.011 0.159 0.016 10.060 0.000
Am Best Rating Of A ? -0.096 0.010 -10.060 0.000 0.018 0.004 4.380 0.000 0.093 0.023 3.960 0.000
Am Best Rating Of A-  ? -0.031 0.009 -3.660 0.000 -0.041 0.004 -10.220 0.000 0.112 0.020 5.470 0.000
Time Indicators
1996 Indicator + -0.014 0.006 -2.170 0.030 -0.007 0.003 -2.590 0.010 0.103 0.015 6.710 0.000
1997 Indicator + -0.043 0.008 -5.710 0.000 0.010 0.003 3.160 0.002 0.144 0.023 6.220 0.000
1998 Indicator + -0.089 0.011 -8.410 0.000 0.026 0.004 5.850 0.000 0.129 0.034 3.830 0.000
N 16198 33411 16815
R
2
0.936        0.948         0.886        
NY Contract Demand Equations Classified by Ratio of Catastrophic Loss Costs to Total Loss Costs




Lowest 25% ILC-Cat/ILC Middle 50% Highest 25% ilc_cat/ILC
Table 5a NY Panel A.  Effect of Ratings on Households Below Guarantee Fund Policy Limit.
Rating Coefficient** Std. Error T-stat Prob
Total Demand A -0.2175 0.0252 -8.6300 0.000
A- -0.3947 0.0344 -11.4800 0.000
B+ 0.0723 0.0366 1.9800 0.048
NR2*** 0.4643 0.0517 8.9800 0.000
Cat Coverage A 0.456 0.040 11.440 0.000
A- -0.135 0.054 -2.480 0.013
B+ -0.152 0.058 -2.630 0.009
NR2 0.379 0.082 4.640 0.000
Non-Cat Coverage A -0.222 0.019 -11.620 0.000
A- -0.143 0.026 -5.490 0.000
B+ 0.199 0.028 7.160 0.000
NR2 0.299 0.039 7.610 0.000
Panel B.  Effect of Ratings on Households Above Guarantee Fund Policy Limit.
Rating Coefficient Std. Error T-stat Prob
Total Demand A -0.1247 0.0495 -2.5200 0.012
A- -0.4268 0.0686 -6.2200 0.000
B+ -0.5281 0.2543 -2.0800 0.038
NR2 0.1192 0.1472 0.8100 0.418
Cat Coverage A -0.12107 0.086471 -1.4 0.162
A- -0.6943 0.119737 -5.8 0.000
B+ -1.06289 0.443832 -2.39 0.017
NR2 0.405322 0.256869 1.58 0.114
Non-Cat Coverage A -0.12228 0.026882 -4.55 0.000
A- -0.18532 0.037223 -4.98 0.000
B+ -0.17548 0.137977 -1.27 0.204
NR2 -0.12237 0.079855 -1.53 0.126
*Regression Coefficients estimates obtained using models like those in Table 4.
**Note that the coefficients are relative to Rating of A+ and Above.
Regression Coefficient Estimates for Various A.M. Best 
Ratings on the Demand for Insurance (Total, Cat, and Non-
Cat) for Policies with Coverage A limits above and below 
Florida's Guarantee fund Policy Limit ($300K).  
***NR2 represents one large company in Florida that is a subsidairy of a well known 
national company with a current A++ rating.  The company was rated NR2 due to its 
lack of experience.  It is currently ranked A by AM Best.
Table 6